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ABSTRACT

There are two opposing hypotheses regarding the informative role of stock prices. The
first hypothesis argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow where security prices
reflect the consequences of managers’ decisions for firms’ cash flows but do not
influence them. In other words, trading in secondary markets has no direct impact on
firms’ decisions. The second, known as the “active informant hypothesis”, states that
security prices influence managers’ real decisions because some investors trade on
private information not available to managers, who therefore rely on stock prices as a
source of information. There is recent evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. In order
to help elucidate this current debate, this dissertation examines the stock price
informativeness of firms facing a product market threat and competition from their peers.
I reason that when facing a threat, managers of firms tend to be more inquisitive about
their price stock movements and also about the stock price movements of their peers.
Indeed, my empirical analyses show that managers of firms facing higher product market
threat and competition are more sensitive to the information contained in their stock
prices. I also find that firms learn more from their peers’ stock price movements as the
level threat is greater except when the threat is at its highest level.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
“(An efficient market) has a very desirable feature. In particular, at any point in
time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource allocation;
that is, firms can make production-investment decisions, and consumers can
choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under
the presumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all available
information. A market in which prices fully reflect available information is called
efficient.” —Eugene Fama and Merton Miller, the Theory of Finance (1972, p
335)
“Our examiners are extremely good at what they do, but any good examiner
recognizes that data should come from a variety of different sources, including
the signals that come from the market. Therefore, market discipline can be an
important adjunct to the supervisory process.” —Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Ex
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005).
“The stock market rally of the past four years shows that capital expenditure is
not an essential driver for equities,” says Pierre Lapointe, head of global strategy
and research at Pavilion Global Markets in Montreal. He also adds “However,
history tells us that companies that grow their capital expenditure programs
usually do much better than companies that do not.”
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The contribution of the financial sector to the economy has become
increasingly pervasive in the past two decades. Going all the way back to
Schumpeter (1911), the financial literature abounds with articles that show that a
well-functioning financial system contributes positively to a country’s economic
growth. To cite a few, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and
Rajan and Zingales (1997) link capital markets and economic growth and all
argue that a more developed financial sector leads to economic growth. Merton
and Bodie (1995) argue that the main role of a financial sector is to allocate
economic resources in a risky environment. This role has been further subdivided
by Levine (2005) into five categories: First to transmit information about possible
investments and capital allocation, second to monitor investments and exert
corporate control, third to facilitate diversification and management of
uncertainty, fourth to mobilize and pool savings, and fifth to facilitate the
exchange of goods and services. This dissertation is mainly concerned with the
first role of financial markets (its informative role) and in particular how the
information in the stock price movements is channeled which in turn reflects the
efficiency of the financial markets.
One of the most relevant issues in finance is market efficiency, which is
defined as the extent to which market prices are informative about the value of
traded assets and whether financial markets have an impact on the overall
economy. Some economists argue that the debates over market efficiency would
not as be prominent as they are if the stock market did not affect real economic
activity. Eugene Fama in his Foundations of Finance (1976, p 132) contends
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that: “An efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing
information. In an efficient market, prices “fully reflect available information”.
The issue of market efficiency has become particularly pertinent after the
recent financial crisis which began in August 2007 and was triggered by
consumer defaults on subprime mortgages and had significant adverse effects on
the U.S. financial sector and caused the most dramatic bank failure in U.S.
history. Consequently, more research has been devoted to examining the role of
financial markets and whether they impact the real economy. In particular, a line
of research investigates why managers constantly monitor the performance of
their firm’s stock and how firms’ stock prices affect real managerial decisions.
Corporate managers usually make three vital decisions namely, investment
decisions, payout decisions, and financing decisions. Managers undertake
investments in the sole purpose of ameliorating the future value of the firm. Since
we know that share prices are forward looking and incorporate the information
pertaining to the expected value of the firm, one would expect that investment and
stock prices to be linked. The financial literature abounds with scholar articles
that find a positive relationship between a firm’s investment and stock returns.
However, there is no absolute consensus that the aforementioned relationship is
always positive. Some scholars argue that the link between capital expenditure
and stock return often hinges upon the characteristics of the firm in consideration.
Some other scholars find that there is a negative relationship between corporate
investment and stock market return. In this dissertation we incorporate the
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element of threat and one of our goals is to help elucidate this debate and help
reach some sort of consensus related to this very vital discussion.
There are two main opposing views regarding the informative role of stock
prices. The first view argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow where
security prices reflect the consequences of managers’ decisions for firms’ cash
flows but do not influence them. In other words, trading in secondary markets has
no direct impact on firms’ decisions. The second, known as the “active informant
hypothesis”, states that security prices influence managers’ real decisions because
some investors trade on private information not available to managers, who
therefore rely on stock prices a source of information.
There is ample evidence that the stock market is not merely a sideshow but
rather has an effect on real economic activity which is associated with the
informational role of stock prices. In fact, the rationale behind the fact that real
decision makers (or managers) learn from the information in the secondary
market prices can be divided into three lines of reasoning. The first line of
reasoning argues that managers learn from information in their firms’ stock prices
and utilize this information to make real decisions. The idea was originally
introduced by Hayek (1945) who argued that prices are a useful source of
information. A financial market is a venue where many speculators with different
pieces of information meet to trade, trying to capitalize on their information.
Stock prices gather this myriad of pieces of information and present an accurate
assessment of firm value which will be used by managers in order to guide their
decisions. In other words, stock prices enable managers to utilize those diverse
4

pieces of information from different traders who have no other means of
communicating with managers outside the trading process. But the skeptics might
ask how could managers learn from their own stock prices? They are closer to the
firm than market traders and are expected to have superior information about the
firm. The answer is quite simple: the informativeness of stock prices does not
posit that managers have less information than other investors in the capital
market, but rather decision makers do not possess perfect information related to
their firm. Other investors may have additional information that could be
beneficial to them. According to Grossman (1976) and Hellwig (1980), even
though an individual investor may be less informed than the manager, the stock
market price reflects the information of a collection of investors who on aggregate
may be more informed. Furthermore, managerial decisions do not rely on internal
information solely related to the firm, but also on information related to the
economic environment, the industry outlook, the firm’s competitive position
competition among other external sources of information. In fact, Allen (1993)
contends that financial markets have become more informative as production
processes have become more convoluted. The second line of reasoning argues that
even if managers do not learn from stock prices, they are interested in market
prices because their compensation is often linked to how the stock price of their
firm fares. As a result, managers will make real decisions contingent on the extent
to which they will impact their firm’s stock price which reverts us to the
informational role of prices. Finally, the third line of reasoning is often preferred
by behaviorist and assumes that managers irrationally rely on the stock price to
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form their decisions and often use it as an anchor. They reason that real decision
makers look at the price rather than other public signals because the price is often
perceived to convey more information (Baker and Wurgler (2012)).
There are three distinct hypotheses related to the informative role of financial
markets and were introduced by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) (MSV
hereafter). MSV introduced the “passive informant” hypothesis which argues that
the stock market is merely a sideshow and does not play any important role in
allocating investment funds. It says that the firm’s decision makers know more
than the public about the investment opportunities facing the firm. The market
might tell the manager what market participants think about the firm's
investments, but that does not influence his/her decisions. Their “accurate active
informant” hypothesis states that the stock market plays a bigger role and that
stock prices affect a firm’s investment because they convey to managers
information which facilitates their decision making process. It argues that security
price influence managers’ real decisions because some investors trade on private
information not available to managers, who therefore rely on stock prices as a
source of information. Their “faulty active informant” argues that managers’
decisions about investment are influenced by stock price movements, but
managers cannot distinguish between movements reflecting fundamentals and
those reflecting market “sentiment”. One of this dissertation’s goals is to help
elucidate this debate and show that the accurate active informant hypothesis is
valid.
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A recent stream of research argues that managers can learn valuable
information about the prospects of their own firm from observing their stock
price. This idea originates from Hayek’s (1945) intuition that stock prices
efficiently aggregate information from various participants and hence help
improving the allocation of resources. According to Fresard (2010) “The
aggregation of information is permitted by the trading activity of diverse
speculators that transmit their private information into market prices via their
trades (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Kyle (1985)).Because these
speculators may not have the possibility or willingness to share their information
with managers directly, stock prices may incorporate specific information that
managers do not possess. As a result, if (some) investors have information about a
company’s prospects that those running the company ignore, the information
embedded in stock prices may help reduce this information asymmetry and
improve firms’ decisions.”
The dissertation makes two main contributions to the finance literature.
First, it contributes to the intensive literature that studies the interactions between
product market competition and firms’ managers’ behavior. We show that the
greater the threat the more attentive managers are to the information in their own
stock market movements. We also find that the greater the competition a firm
faces from its rivals the more sensitive managers are to the information contained
in their peers’ stock price movements except when the level of threat is at its
highest level. Second, we contribute to literature supporting the managerial
learning hypothesis which states that managers do learn from their stock price
7

movements and their peer’s stock price movements and that the capital markets
are not merely a sideshow. Product market threat seems to serve as a catalyst that
induces managers to work more efficiently and be more attentive to the
information contained in capital markets.
Whether firm managers look at their stock price movements is a matter of
paramount importance. In fact, firms live and die by their stock price and the
stock price movements are deemed to be of vital importance to the incumbent
managers. The most evident reason why managers are concerned about the stock
price of their corresponding firms is that they are most of the time shareholder too
and have a stake in the company. Very often we find encounter cases where the
founder of a public company to own a substantial number of the firm’s shares and
we also find that the managers’ compensation is linked to how their stock and
their compensation is under the form of stock options. It has been documented
that tying a managers’ compensation with the stock price mitigates agency
conflicts between managers and shareholders and align their interests. in other
words, managers are in a way shareholders of the firm and as a result should pay
attention to how the stock price of their firm behaves.
Stocks represent ownership in a company and hence an investor in a firm
is affected by how the stock movements of his/her firm. A manager’s’ goal is to
maximize the expected utility or wealth of his/her shareholders and to create value
for them and that could be achieved by maximizing the stock prices of the firm. In
the short run, managers might not have great control over their firm’s stock price,
but a continuous poor stock performance could reflect managers’ inaptitude to
8

manage the firm efficiently. In fact, if a firm’s stock price repeatedly
underperforms the analysts forecast previsions and shareholders' expectations, the
latter might consider replacing the incumbent managerial team. In case managers
retrench and resist a change instigated by shareholders, a proxy fight could be
utilized in order to replace the incumbent management. As a result, managers
should always be aware of how their corresponding shareholders perceive their
performance and the stock price of their firms is one barometer to achieve that
goal. As a consequence, stock prices are used by all market participants since
they reflect the well-being of a firm. Traders are always looking for a profit
opportunity and analysts are searching for good investments opportunities for
their clients and stock prices are one measure to reach that end. Furthermore,
creditors also tend to gauge whether firms are sound financially and are able to
pay back their debt and one way of verifying that is too look at their stock prices.
The link between a firm’s stock price and its financial credibility is mainly due to
the inherent link between a firm’s earnings and its stock price. If a company has
strong earnings, it shows stakeholders (creditors included) that the firm can meet
its debt obligations which will permit the firms to take advantage of a lower
capitalization rate which would maximize its return on investment and also make
more projects worth undertaking. Furthermore, a good stock market performance
is valuable for a firm in case it’s planning to issue more shares. A good
performance in the capital market would allow the firm to issue more share at a
profitable price.
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Another reason why a firm’s manager should be concerned with its share
price is due to the threat of takeover by other firms. If the stock price of the firm
decreases significantly, other firms might consider turning around that firm by a
means of a takeover. Many takeovers result in replacing the existing management.
To that end, the acquiring company will be able to pay the firm’s shareholders a
higher premium when stock prices are already low and hence that would
maximize the chances of a takeover. Therefore, a strong stock performance could
serve as deterrence for potential interested bidders and a poor one would serve as
an invitation for potential acquirers.
Furthermore, looking at the takeover from another perspective, a firm with
a good stock performance has a better chance in case it decides to take over
another firm and the takeover could be financed by issuing additional shares.
Doing so would enable the acquiring firm managers to have more assets under
their purview. The final reason why share prices might be of interest to managers
is due to the fact that managers have a reputation to build and the stock price is
one measure of how market participants perceive them. As a consequence, the
higher the stock price, and the larger the market value of the company under their
purview, and the more prestigious their occupation is.
One of the premises of the efficient market hypothesis is that market
participants are rational. A rational individual is supposed to make rational
decisions under uncertainty which would maximize his/her utility. Behaviorists
question the rationality of investors and managers alike. More studies reckon that
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managers may not be always rational and suggest that their financing and
investing decisions might suffer from irrationality.
Going all the way back to the seminal paper by Miller and Modigliani and
Miller (1958), many scholars have examined the investment decisions by
managers and their firms’ capital structure. Most of those scholars have assumed
that managers are rational. For instance Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977),
Myers and Majluf (1984) investigated the phenomenon is signaling by managers
in case of information asymmetries assuming managers are rational. Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Dewatripoint and
Tirole (1991), and Fairchild (2003)) investigated how the capital structure
selected by managers could reduce agency conflicts between principals and
agents. Their methodology uses a principal0agent model which assumes that the
rationality of managers.
Around the beginning of the last decade, more scholars started to reckon
that managers’ decisions might be affected by behavioral shortcomings. For
instance, Shefrin (1999), Heaton (2002), and Hackbarth (2002) have examined the
link between managerial irrationality and capital structure. Statman and Caldwell
1987, Shefrin (1999) , and Gervais et al 2003 analyzed how capital budgeting is
affected by managers’ irrationality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) used a model
where a manager could divert company funds for personal. The found that one
way of aligning the manager’s interest with the one of shareholders is to increase
the debt level and reduce external equity.

11

One of the behavioral biases affecting managers is managerial
overconfidence. Kahnemann and Lovallo (1993), Shefrin (1999), Goel and
Thakor (2000), Malmandier and Tate (2001), Heaton 2002, and Hackbarth 2004
have all examined the phenomenon of managerial overconfidence. Heaton (2002)
finds that agents tend to be overconfident and over-optimistic about matters they
believe they can control.
Traditional finance attempts to understand how financial markets function
by using models in which agents are assumed to be rational. Rationality hinges on
two distinct notions. The first notion is related to whether agents update their
“prior” or beliefs correctly when new information arises as it is explained by
Bayes’ law. The second notion is concerned with whether agents make acceptable
choices based on their beliefs. Proponents of behavioral finance rely on the
irrationality of financial market participants in order to argue against the efficient
market hypothesis. While there is ample research which investigates the
irrationality of investors, the question whether managers are rational is still
limited.
According to the ex-Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, “Quality
information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets. Without it, investor
confidence erodes. Liquidity dries up. Fair and efficient markets simply cease to
exist. As the quantity of information increases exponentially through the Internet
and other technologies, the quality of that information must be our signal priority”
The question whether asset prices reflect all relevant information is one of
the most paramount topics in finance. Notwithstanding, an attempt to empirically
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find a definite answer to that pertinent question is impeded by two major
obstacles. First, information in not easily observable and differentiating between
relevant and irrelevant information has proved to be not a facile task. Second,
quantifying how information is processed by market participants has proved to be
a daunting task.
How information is processed in financial markets has been extensively
examined in the finance literature. Several papers have investigated the process of
trading and how stock prices vary around news releases (Harris and Raviv 1993,
Kandel and Pearson 1995, and Blume, Easley, and O'Hara 1994). The gist of all
those papers revolves around the fact that price reaction is mainly driven by the
amount of unanticipated information.
Little is known about how market participants and in particular how
managers react to new information. As mentioned earlier, behaviorists’ focus has
mainly been geared towards the irrationality of investors and they have
overlooked the rationality/irrationality of managers.
It has been established that stock prices carry new information which
could be useful to managers. The idea dates back to Hayek (1945) who argued
that financial market is a venue where many speculators with different pieces of
information meet to trade, trying to capitalize on their information. Stock prices
gather this myriad of pieces of information and present an accurate assessment of
firm value which will could used by managers in order to guide their decisions
and update their prior and beliefs. In other words, stock prices enable managers to

13

utilize those diverse pieces of information from different traders who have no
other means of communicating with managers outside the trading process.
This dissertation attempts to fill the aforementioned gap in behavioral
finance research by exploring whether managers update their beliefs by extracting
information from the stock price movements of their own firms and the ones
corresponding to their peers.
Some of the traits pertaining to the psyche of investors and which could be
applied to managers’ behavior are belief perseverance and anchoring. According
to Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), once people have formed an opinion, they stick
to it too tightly and for a long time. Barberis and Thaler (2003) cite that belief
perseverance could be explained by the fact that when people once form an
opinion, they tend to cling to it for a long time and they become too reticent to
search for evidence against their beliefs. They also treat new evidence with
skepticism. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1974), when people form
estimates, they usually start with an arbitrary value and then adjust as new
information comes in. Anchoring states that people “anchor” on the initial value
and adjust very slowly to new information.
These psychological traits could be easily translated to managers who
might persevere in their beliefs and ignore any new information contained in the
stock price of their own firms or their peers. Our analysis will determine whether
managers show that kind of behavior toward the flow of new information, in
particular, the information contained in stock price movements when the level of
competition increases. Barberis et al (1998) discuss how a “conservatism bias”
14

might lead investors to underreact to information. In certain cases, in violation of
Bayes’ rule, existing theories suggest that some investors tend to underreact to
unexpected news events. The conservatism bias suggests that individuals
underestimate new information in updating their expectations and as a
consequence prices will tend to slowly adjust to information.
According to Hirshleifer (2003), another psychological behavior that
could be applied to managers is the phenomenon of “limited attention” which is a
consequence of the large amount of information available out there and the limits
to individuals’ processing power. Kahneman (1973) cites that attention is a scarce
cognitive resource. It has been documented that there is a the cognitive-processing
capacity of the human brain has a limit and that the phenomenon is limited
attention is due to the substantial amount of information available to agents. The
“ostrich effect” documented by Lowenstein and Seppi (2005) states that investors
pay more attention to stocks when the market is rising, but ignore the stock prices
when the markets are doing poorly.
Kahhneman (1973) argues that attention must be selective and requires
effort. Fiske (1995) that individuals encode information by taking external
information and representing it internally in a way that is usable. According to
Herb Simon “the scarce resource is not information; it is processing capacity to
attend to information. Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity,
and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of
organizations, where parallel processing capacity become less easy” (Simon 1973,
page 270.).
15

Limited managerial attention has been investigated literature, but from
different angles. Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) focus on how to allocate
different tasks among managers with different ability and the optimal organization
structure of a firm. Darrough and Melumad (1995) examine a setting in which a
principal motivates a manager with unknown ability to allocate his effort between
his own division and other division, and illustrate that sometimes it is optimal to
motivate the manager to concentrate on his own. In this dissertation, we will
investigate whether managers exhibit “limited attention” pertaining to the
information in their stock price movements and the one pertaining to their peers
and how the intention of managers changes with a higher level of competition
from their peers.

.On

the other side of the spectrum, there is the phenomenon of “increased

attention” where the agent makes an extra effort in order to serve his interests or
the principal’s interests. Warner and Watt (1987) examine the relationship
between the stock price movements of a firm and the subsequent top management
changes. They find an inverse relationship between the two. As a result, managers
ought to look at the stock price movements since they reflect whether their job is
in jeopardy and that would be even more pronounced when their firm is facing
higher threat from competitors.
Another benefit of managers inquiring about their stock price movements
and the ones of their peers is the fact that they will be able to reduce any
information asymmetry between the informed investors and the less informed
ones. Furthermore, it has been documented that when the level of competition is
16

higher, the degree of exploitation of private information is lower (Holden and
Subrahmanyam 1992, 1994; Foster and Viswanathan 1993, 1994, 1996). This
occurs because competition leads private information to be incorporated into
prices more quickly (i.e., prices become more informative about fundamental
value). This effect has two potential implications for the pricing of information
asymmetry. First, in a Kyle (1985) type model, competition reduces the need for
market makers to price protect because it lowers the extent to which information
asymmetry is exploited. Second, in an Easley and O’Hara (2004) type model,
competition reduces the risk of information asymmetry to uninformed investors
because the collective trades by informed investors lead to greater information
being reflected in the equilibrium price. Hence, when facing higher threat, the
managers would benefit even further by inquiring about their stock price
movements since they contain even more information as competition increases.
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CHAPTER 2

Review of Literature
There are many notable differences between the fields of finance and
macroeconomics. One of their salient differences is their perspective of the stock
market. Finance scholars consider the stock market as the most important market
which affects corporate investment decisions, whereas macroeconomists give a
minor role to the stock market when it comes to making investment decisions. In
fact, it has been established that the stock market is a predictor of the business
cycle and provided that the stock market is well-functioning and rational, stock
price movements can be deemed as a predictor of the business cycle. According to
Henry (2003) “Changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations about
future corporate earnings and changes in the discount rate at which these expected
earnings are capitalized”. As a result, stock prices seem to possess a forwardlooking property which renders the stock market a plausible predictor of the
business cycle. If in addition the information contained in stock prices is deemed
of high quality, then stock price movements would produce concise and reliable
predictions
Notwithstanding the stock market has been recognized as a predictor of
the business cycle in theory, macroeconomic forecasters have been reluctant to
give importance to its predictions. According to Moore (1983), the stock market

18

receives rather modest attention compared with other indicators such as interest
rate and money supply changes which are frequently showcased for their business
cycle predictive ability by macroeconomists. Moore goes on to show that during
the period of 1873 to 1975, the stock market had led the business cycle at eighteen
of twenty peaks and at seventeen of twenty three troughs.
The contribution of the financial sector to the economy has become
increasingly pervasive in the past two decades. Going all the way back to
Schumpeter (1911), the financial literature abounds with articles that show that a
well-functioning financial system contributes positively to a country’s economic
growth. To cite a few, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and
Rajan and Zingales (1997) link capital markets and economic growth and all
argue that a more developed financial sector leads to economic growth. Merton
and Bodie (1995) argue that the main role of a financial sector is to allocate
economic resources in a risky environment. This role has been further subdivided
by Levine (2005) into five categories: First to transmit information about possible
investments and capital allocation, second to monitor investments and exert
corporate control, third to facilitate diversification and management of
uncertainty, fourth to mobilize and pool savings, and fifth to facilitate the
exchange of goods and services. This dissertation is mainly concerned with the
first role of financial markets (its informative role) and in particular how the
information in the stock price movements is channeled which in turn reflects the
efficiency of the financial markets.
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The concept of market efficiency is paramount to financial economics.
The term efficiency is utilized to refer to a market in which relevant information
is incorporated into the price of financial assets which is also referred to as the
informational efficiency of financial markets. The efficient market hypothesis
(EMH) was developed independently by Samuelson and Fama in the 1960s and
gives us a substantial insight into the process of determining the price of an asset
in the marketplace through the interactions of buyers and sellers. EMH has
triggered a series of empirical tests and critiques; chief among them comes from
behaviorists who show skepticism regarding the human rationality assumption.
Bachelier (1900) in his doctoral Mathematics dissertation at the Sorbonne
stated that “past, present and even discounted future events are reflected in market
price” and concluded that asset prices fluctuate randomly. Haplessly, Bachelier’s
insight was overlooked for more than half a century until it was circulated to
economists by Paul Samuelson in the late 1950s and then translated to English by
Cootner in 1964.
The EMH was originally formulated independently in the 1960s by
Eugene Fama and Paul Samuelson. In 1965, Paul Samuelson wrote an article
whose article is ‘Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly’. He
argues that in a market that is informationally efficient, price changes must be
unpredictable if they fully reflect the information and expectations of all market
participants. In other words, Samuelson argues that “There is no way of making
an expected profit by extrapolating past changes in the future price, by chart or
any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics”. Fama (1963; 1965a; 1965b,
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1970) introduced in his seminal papers the concept of market efficiency and states
that a market in which prices at any time “fully reflect available information is
called efficient”. His research stems primarily from his interest in the statistical
properties of stock prices and the ongoing debate between technical and
fundamental analyses. In 1978, Jensen wrote “I believe there is no other
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis”. Lucas (1978) adds that in markets where
all investors have ‘rational expectations’, prices do fully reflect all available
information and marginal-utility weighted prices follow martingales. There were
several extensions of the EMH including the consideration of non-traded assets
such as human capital, non-homogeneous expectations, asymmetric information,
taxes, transactions costs, and various other forms of extensions. However the
general ides is the same: investors are rational, markets are efficient when it
comes to gathering information, and equilibrium prices reflect all relevant
information. (Lo 2007)
A substantial portion of the financial sector’s activity transpires in the
secondary market. Secondary financial markets play a major role in linking
borrowers and savers of capital and serve as a venue where their exchanges take
place. The allocation of capital is a primary role of capital markets and the
investment policy of firms is a major element of the allocation process. But does
the stock market provide information to its participants or is it merely a sideshow?
This question has become particularly pertinent after the recent financial crisis.
One salient feature of a financial market is that a great part of its activity takes
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places in secondary financial markets where instruments are traded among market
participants without the firm’s involvement. What transpires in the stock markets
is daily reported by the press and media and is constantly tracked by managers.
Can this be a signal that stock prices inherently contain information of interest to
the market participants including firm managers which ultimately might impact
the real economic activity? One could answer this question by simply arguing that
one way of testing this question is to investigate whether stock prices affect a firm
decision maker’s actions. Hayek (1945) wrote “We must look at the price system
as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its
real function…The most significant fact about this system is the economy of
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to
know in order to be able to take the right action”. He further argues that prices are
a useful source of information and that financial market is a venue where many
speculators with different pieces of information meet to trade, trying to capitalize
on their information. Stock prices gather this myriad of pieces of information and
present an accurate assessment of firm value which will be used by managers in
order to guide their decisions. In other words, stock prices enable managers to
utilize those diverse pieces of information from different traders who have no
other means of communicating with managers outside the trading process.
Baumol (1965) argues that firm managers will learn from this information and
utilize it to guide their decisions which will affect firm cash flows and values.
Consequently, the financial market has a real effect on the economy by conveying
information from investors to managers. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen
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and Meckling (1976) argue that stock prices can be utilized as a monitoring tool.
They reason that a firm’s stock prices movements reflect the managers’ decisions.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that “the existence of a well-organized market
in which corporate claims are continuously assessed is perhaps the single most
important control mechanism affecting managerial behavior in modem industrial
economies”. Fama (1976) wrote “if the capital market is to function smoothly in
allocating resources, prices of securities must be good indicators of value”. Tobin
(1969) shows that the stock price of a firm can be utilized by a manager in order
to make optimal investment decisions. He relates investment to q, which is the
ratio of the market’s valuation of capital to the cost of acquiring new capital. An
increase in the prospective return on capital or a decrease in the market’s discount
rate raises q and thereby increases investment. With a simple form of adjustment
cost for changing the capital stock, the optimal amount of current investment
depends only on the current value of q.
Resorting to the stock prices in order to make corporate decisions hinges
on the assumption that the capital markets are efficient. According to Fama and
Miller (1972) “An efficient market has a very desirable feature. In particular, at
any point in time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource
allocation; that is, firms can make production-investment decisions, and
consumers can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’
activities under the presumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all
available information. A market in which prices fully reflect available information
is called efficient.”
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In a capitalist world, prices are used to balance supply and demand for
goods and services and price changes serve to redeploy resources in the most
efficient way possible. Secondary market prices are often perceived as the most
“informationally efficient” prices in the economy (Dow and Gorton (1997). The
market is interested in learning about managers’ decisions but the manager may
also want to glean into stock prices in order to gauge how to market reacts to
prospective investments. Stock prices may be used by managers since it conveys
information about prospective investment projects and cash flows. In other words,
information in stock prices will be utilized by managers in order to make
investment decisions since managers will be compensated based on subsequent
stock price information. In sum, stock prices indirectly affect managerial
investment decisions by imparting two sorts of information: one pertains to
investment opportunities and refers to the “prospective” role of stock market
prices and the other reflects managers’ past decisions and choices and refers to the
“retrospective” role of stock market prices. Thus, the capital market has both an
informative and monitoring role. Dow and Gorton (1997) further argue that
shareholders want managers to learn from the information contained in stock
prices and intend to induce them to act this way. Along the same line, Boot and
Thakor (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) use the feedback effect to
rationalize a firm’s choice to issue publicly traded securities, rather than receiving
private financing (e.g., from a bank). In these models, public trading allows the
firm to infer information from its stock price and use it to improve its real
decisions. They show that managers can improve their investment decisions by
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observing stock-price movements because stock prices contain information that is
aggregated from investors who do not communicate directly with firms. Foucault
and Gehrig (2008) extend this reasoning to explain the decision of a firm to crosslist shares in two different markets: Cross-listing enables the firm to obtain more
precise information from the stock market and improve the efficiency of its
investment decisions.
But one could pose the following question: How could outside investors
be more informed than the managers of the firm themselves?

According to

Grossman (1976) and Hellwig (1980), even though an individual investor may be
less informed than the manager, the stock market price reflects the information of
a collection of investors who on aggregate may be more informed. Furthermore,
managerial decisions do not rely on internal information solely related to the firm,
but also on information related to the economic environment, the industry
outlook, the firm’s competitive position competition among other external sources
of information. In fact, Allen (1993) contends that financial markets have become
more informative as production processes have become more convoluted.
Furthermore, Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) and Michaely and Shaw
(1994) found that outsiders know more than insiders about the value of the firm
when it comes to initial public offering (IPO) issuance. Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (MSV hereafter) (1990) argue that the debates over market efficiency
would not be as lively as they are if the stock market did not impact real economic
activity. MSV (1990) were the first to formally categorize the possible cases of
informativeness of the stock market and its interaction with firms’ decision
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makers. They introduced four distinct hypotheses related to the informative role
of financial markets. The first theory states that the stock market is merely a
sideshow and does not play any role in affecting managers’ investment decisions.
The second theory states that managers rely on the stock market as a source of
information when they make investment decisions but that information may or
may not be accurate in determining the firm’s prospects. The third theory and
most probably the most common view of the stock market role states that the
stock market affects managers’ investment through its influence on the cost of
funds and external financing. Finally, the fourth theory states that the stock
market affects managers’ decisions not because of its informational and financing
role but rather due to the fact that managers must adhere to investors' preferences
in order to protect their livelihood.
In relation to our empirical analysis, MSV defined the “passive informant”
hypothesis which argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow and does not
play any important role in allocating investment funds. It says that the firm’s
decision makers know more than the public about the investment opportunities
facing the firm. The market might reflect what market participants think about the
firm's investments, but that does not influence managers’ decisions. This view
portrays the stock market as a sideshow where firm managers do not learn
anything from the stock price. The passive informant hypothesis has gained great
support since it makes sense to reason that outsiders know less about the firm than
insiders. The passive informant hypothesis draws support from the literature on
insider trading. Seyhun (1986) shows that insiders make money on trading in their
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firms' stock and that they successfully predict their firm’s future return which
suggests that insiders’ knowledge helps them with forecasting their firm’s return.
Their “accurate active informant” hypothesis states that “the stock market
plays a bigger role and that stock prices affect a firm’s investment because they
convey to managers information which facilitates their decision making process.
It argues that security price influence managers’ real decisions because some
investors trade on private information not available to managers, who therefore
rely on stock prices as a source of information. Therefore, according to the active
informant hypothesis the stock market is not merely a sideshow but rather plays a
greater role in the managerial decision process. MSV further argue that even if the
stock market might send inaccurate signal, the information may still be used and
so the stock return will influence investment. Their “faulty active informant”
argues that managers’ decisions about investment are influenced by stock price
movements, but managers cannot distinguish between movements reflecting
fundamentals and those pertaining to market sentiment.”
Corporate managers usually make three vital decisions namely, investment
decisions, payout decisions, and financing decisions. Managers undertake
investments in the sole purpose of ameliorating the future value of the firm. Since
we know that share prices are forward looking and incorporate the information
pertaining to the expected value of the firm, one would expect that investment and
stock prices to be linked. The financial literature abounds with scholar articles
that find a positive relationship between a firm’s investment and stock returns.
However, there is no absolute consensus that the mentioned relationship is always
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positive. Some scholars argue that the link between capital expenditure and stock
return often hinge upon the characteristics of the firm in consideration. According
to Naran Bhana (2008) “The market responds significantly and positively to
capital announcements by focused firms, whereas there is a much weaker
response to announcements by diversified companies”. Chung, Wright, and
Charoenwong (1998) argue that the share price reaction to a company’s capital
expenditures depends on how that market perceives that specific investment.
Some scholars also put forward the argument that stock markets are not always
efficient in processing information and may not always reflect the real expected
value of the firm. As a result, relying on the stock market prices to make
investment decisions might not always be sensible. In fact Bosworth (1975) states
that is incomprehensible that managers would base their investment decisions on
a very volatile short-lived changes in stock prices. Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo
(2002) examine the relationship between capital investment, growth options, and
stock returns. They find that stock returns are negatively linked to firm-level
investment. More specifically, they find that subsequent monthly returns are
significantly lower for firms that have recently accelerated investment spending.
On the other hand, there is a vast line of literature which finds that there is
appositive relationship between corporate investments and stock market return.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) study the market reaction to capital
expenditure decisions by industrial and public utility firms. They find they when
firms announce an increase in capital expenditures it’s reflected by a positive
stock return for industrial firms. They also find that when the firms announce a
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decrease in capital expenditure it’s reflected by a negative stock return for those
firms. Tease (1993) went a step further and decomposed the stock price into
speculative and fundamental components and argued that the speculative part
does not influence investment decisions. Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1990)
and Chirinko and Schaller (1996) also support the idea that the inefficiencies of
the stock market seem not to impact investment.
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) argue that stock prices usually respond
positively to major corporate investment. However, financing originating from
increased investment (issuing equity for instance) leads to a negative stock return
(Loughran and Ritter (1995)). They further argue that corporate decisions related
to decreased investment (repurchases for instance) usually results in positive stock
returns. They also find that firms that increase their investment expenditures they
mainly tend to underperform their benchmarks over the following five years.
Titman, Wei, Xie present an explanation as to why stock returns might react
negatively to an increase in investment. They reason that it might be due to the
fact the managers usually attempt to justify their investment by embellishing their
new business opportunities. However, if the investors do not appreciate those new
ventures instigated by the managers, it could be reflected negatively on the stock
return. This phenomenon, they argue, could be even more accentuated for
managers deemed to be empire builders. In sum, Titman, Wei, and Xie document
a negative relationship between capital investment and future stock returns.
Some authors introduced theoretical models relating corporate investment and
stock return. For instance, Cochrane (1991, 1996) introduces an asset pricing
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model based on aggregate capital investment and shows that it fares as well as the
Capital asset pricing model and the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) model.
There is also ample evidence that there is a positive relationship between a
firm’s R&D and stock return (Chan, Martin, and Kensinger 1990; Chan,
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002;
Chu 2007; Lin 2007; Li and Liu 2010)). Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990)
found that that there is a positive significant stock market reaction to the
announcements of increased R&D expenditures by US firms. Nonetheless, the
reaction was found to be negative when it comes to low technology firms, which
indicates that the stock market is able to differentiate between good and bad
investments and ultimately rewards firms undertaking sensible investments. Li
(2011) examines the link between financial constrained firms, R&D investments,
and stock returns. He finds that R&D predicts returns only among financially
constrained firms. In other words, there is a strong interaction effect between
financial constraints, R&D investment, and stock expected returns.
Woolridge and Snow (1990) analyzed the market reaction to different
types of investment announcements. They categorized them as joint ventures,
R&D, capital expenditure, and product market diversification. They found that
there is a positive reaction to each category of investment. They further examined
whether the size of the project and its longevity affect that relationship between
investment and stock returns. They find that the market does not differentiate
between large and small projects, and between long- and short- term projects.

30

Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) analyze the relation between a firm’s stock
returns at the announcement of an acquisition and management's subsequent
actions. They find that managers’ use of market information depends mainly on
the private information they possess. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that
managers rely on their firm’s stock performance to determine the number of
shares they decide to repurchase. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) contend that
a company's stock price impacts how the firm is perceived by its customers,
suppliers, employees, lenders, and other stakeholders. Moreover, the way the firm
is perceived affects their purchase, supply, or investment decisions, which
eventually affect the firm's cash flow. Recent studies lend support to this direct
feedback from asset prices to asset cash flows.
Accrding to Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) “corporate investment is
sensitive to nonfundamental movements in stock prices”. They assert that
corporate investment and the stock market are positively correlated in both time
series and cross-sectional analysis. They reason that the reason behind that
positive relation is the fact the stock prices reflect the marginal product. They
further specify that that reasoning is mainly based on the relationship between
investment and Tobin’s Q introduced first by Tobin (1969) and later by
Furstenberg (1977). Sunder (2005) provides evidence that financing costs of firms
are affected by information spillovers from stock markets and shows that the
firms’ bank borrowing costs are decreasing in measures of information production
in stock markets. In particular, Sunder’s paper investigates the value if a firm
based on the information spillovers from its publicly traded stock. The concept of
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“Information spillover” was first explored by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who
showed that information produced by informed investors could be communicated
to uninformed though stock prices. Along the same line, Allen and Gale (2000)
state that stock prices play a significant role in aggregating formation. They
contend that when there is uncertainty regarding the optimal action to be taken by
firms, financial markets serve as a mechanism for aggregating dispersed beliefs.
Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2000) have examined the interaction between the
existence of an informative stock price and the incentives of the initial equity
investor to monitor. They found that having an informative stock price improves
monitoring incentives. Polk and Sapienza (2009) test how stock market
mispricing might influence individual firms’ investment decisions. They find that
a firm’s investment decision is related to the market mis-valuation of the firm.
More specifically, they find that a typical change in their mispricing proxy
triggers about a two percent change in the company’s investment. They further
show that the greater the degree of asymmetric information between firms and
investors, the more sensitive the firm’s investment decisions are sensitive to the
stock market mispricing.
Dye and Srydar (2002) state that capital market participants in aggregate
may have information pertaining to the firm unknown to the managers of the firm.
They examine whether managers utilize the capital market’s information in order
to make or alter their managerial strategies. They show that managers are able to
extract information from the stock market by first making a new strategy available
to the public and then observe the market reaction to the announcement of that
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strategy. They further show that stock market prices can be used to direct
managers’ decisions. They further reason that information flows from the stock
market to firms because first of all prices in stock markets, like all prices, impact
resource allocation decisions. Second, stock market participants are experts in
valuation and their success hinges on their accuracy to estimate firms’ future
decisions. Thus, they conclude that capital markets should therefore possess
information not available to managers.
Burton and Seale (2005) delineate the use of market data to monitor
insured institutions’ risk. They quote Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System who said “Our examiners are
extremely good at what they do, but any good examiner recognizes that data
should come from a variety of different sources, including the signals that come
from the market. Therefore, market discipline can be an important adjunct to the
supervisory process”.
Luo (2005) analyzes 200 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US in
the 1990s and finds that merging firms appear to learn from the market during the
M&A process by observing how the market reacts to the merger announcement.
His study shows that the information contained in stock prices enhances
managers’ information sets and affects their forward-looking disclosures. It also
supports the fact that information flows between firms and capital markets.
Chen, Goldstein & Jiang (2007) state that “two measures of the amount of
private information in stock price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of
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informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of
corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion
of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables.
The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock
price about their own firms’ fundamentals and incorporate this information in the
corporate investment decisions”. We relate our findings to an alternative
explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by
capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative
channel contribute to this sensitivity.
Behaviorists link competition and behavioral consequences. Going all the
way back to Triplett (1898) who documented a link between competition and task
performance and that rivalry is a powerful psychological phenomenon with
substantial behavioral consequences Kilduff, Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state
that “they believe that rivalry may have a range of important consequences for the
attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of competitors. A number of studies have
linked competition to enhanced motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and
Tauer and Harackiewicz (2004)) and task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown
et al. (1998), and Tauer amd Harackiewicz (2004))”.
The way decision makers perceive their market environment (their
competitors) and the firm’s prospective delineate their corporate strategy which in
turn affects the performance of the firm and the market in which it operates. The
relations between the firm and its market environment lie at the intersection
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between the field of industrial organization which is a branch of economics and
the field of organizational behavior and administration. (Caves)
Going all the way back to Smith (1776) who stated that “Monoply is a
great enemy to good management”, scholars such as Alchian (1950) and Stigler
(1958) have argued that competition in the product market is a powerful
mechanism ensuring that management does not waste corporate resources.
There is a growing literature which examines the relationship between
product market competition, managerial incentives alignment, and efficiency.
Caves and Barton (1990) and Caves (1992) find that above a certain level of
industry concentration, technical efficiency is reduced. Nickell, Nicolitsas and
Dryden (1997) observe that UK firms that face more competition also face higher
levels of productivity growth. Raith (2003) shows that stronger competition
implies better alignment of manager’s incentives. Fabrizio et al. (2010) find that
the utilities deregulation in the U.S. has made utilities firms more productive.
Economists argue that managers of firms in competitive industries have
strong incentives to reduce slack and maximize profits (Giroud and Mueller
(2010)). The empirical literature concludes that competition induces better
corporate governance which in turn aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests.
In fact, the “quiet life” hypothesis which was originally formulated by Sir John
Hick in 1935 argues that managers in non-competitive industries tend to enjoy a
quiet life which can lead to managerial slack, while managers in competitive
industries are constantly under pressure and are prone to improve efficiency. As
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Sir John Hicks put it “the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life”. Hart (1983)
shows that competition mitigates managerial slack. Holmstrom (1982) and
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase in the number of
competitors may provide additional information that can be used to mitigate
moral hazard. Schmidt (1997) shows that competition increases the probability
that a firm with high costs becomes unprofitable and must be liquidated, which
induces managers to work hard in order to keep their jobs and avoid the likelihood
of liquidation. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market competition
provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently because
competition forces out incompetent managers. They go even further and contend
that product market competition may be a more effective corporate governance
mechanism than either the market for corporate control or monitoring by
institutions. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010)
find evidence supporting the predictions of the “quiet life” hypothesis, namely
that managers in concentrated industries avoid difficult tasks such as firing
employees, negotiating with employees over salaries, or negotiating with
suppliers over prices of inputs. Chhaochharia, Grinstein, Grullon, Michaely
(2012) attain results that reinforce the “quiet life” hypothesis in that managers in
concentrated industries decrease slack more than managers in non-concentrated
industries.
It has been documented that the efficiency of corporate investments is
influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. By inquiring
about their own stock price movements and the one of their peers, managers
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might mitigate the asymmetric information and hence improve their investment
efficiency. Stein in his 2009 JF presidential address states there might be a link
between competition and the financial market efficiency. In fact, there is a
growing literature which examines the relationship between product market
competition, managerial incentives alignment, and efficiency. Caves and Barton
(1990) and Caves (1992) find that above a certain level of industry concentration,
technical efficiency is reduced. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) observe
that UK firms that face more competition also face higher levels of productivity
growth. Raith (2003) shows that stronger competition implies better alignment of
manager’s incentives. Fabrizio et al. (2010) find that the utilities deregulation in
the U.S. has made utilities firms more productive. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
note that “product market competition is probably the most powerful force
towards economic efficiency in the world". Schmidt (1997) shows that
competition increases the probability that a firm with high costs becomes
unprofitable and must be liquidated, which induces managers to work hard in
order to keep their jobs and avoid the likelihood of liquidation. Hart (1983) shows
that competition mitigates managerial slack. Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase in the number of competitors may
provide additional information that can be used to mitigate moral hazard. Allen
and Gale (2000) argue that product market competition provides corporate
managers with incentives to behave efficiently because competition forces out
incompetent managers.
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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) find
evidence supporting the predictions of the “quiet life” hypothesis, namely that
managers in concentrated industries avoid difficult tasks such as firing employees,
negotiating with employees over salaries, or negotiating with suppliers over prices
of inputs. Chaocharia, Grinstein, Grullon, Michaely (2012) attain results that
reinforce the “quiet life” hypothesis in that managers in concentrated industries
decrease slack more than managers in non-concentrated industries. Thus,
competition would further enhance the active informant hypothesis. Managers’
efficiency and refraining from slack could be interpreted as paying more attention
to information possessed by sophisticated investors who might have some
information that managers do not possess. This could be done by gleaning over
their stock price movements and the one of their peers, since stock price have
been proved to contain residual information that managers might not have.

Griffith (2001) shows that product market competition results in a better
productivity, especially among those firms in which managers have conflicts of
interest. Giroud and mueller (2012) investigate the interaction between product
market competition and firms’ payout policy. They find that firms in more
competitive industries pay more dividends than firms in less competitive
industries. Their empirical findings reinforce the idea that product market
competition pushes managers to pay out excess cash and therefore induces
managers to behave in a more efficient manner. Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van
Reenan (2010) investigate the relationship of competition on management quality,
and find that competition in an effective way of improving management.
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Stoughton, Wong, Li (2013) provide a series of empirical tests in order to
investigate the relationship between competition and investment efficiency. Their
findings lend support to the notion that shows that investment is more efficient in
concentrated industries.
Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2012) show that a company’s investment is
highly sensitive to the investments of other companies located nearby. They
further show that even after controlling for its own Q and cash flows, a
company’s investment is strongly related to the Q and cash flows of nearby firms
operating outside its industry. The authors state that “these time-varying regional
effects are large and indicate that local agglomeration economies are important
determinants of firm investment and growth”. In sum, Dougal et al. (2012) find
that investment expenditures depend on the geographic location of the firm and its
proximity to peer firms and even firms operating in different industries. Fracassi
(2011) investigates the relationship between a firm managers’ professional
network and its corresponding managerial decisions. He states that “Social
network theory suggests that individual’s preferences and decisions are affected
by the actions of others”. He finds that the more social connections two firms
have in common, the more similar is their level of investment. Gilbert and
Lieberman (1987) show that firm’s take preemptive actions in order to counter the
competitions from rivals and maintain market share. Their analysis further
indicates that investment reduces the likelihood that competitors will increase
their market share.
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Predation risk is defined as the risk a firm faces from the actions of its
rivals. It has been shown that predation risk in the product market can affect a
firm’s financial decisions significantly. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue
that predation risk is linked to the interaction of a company’s investment
opportunities with that of its competitors. Several recent papers study how
product market competition affects a firm’s financial policy. Recent empirical
studies find that higher predatory threats lead to higher level of cash holdings,
lower dividend payments, and more hedging Haushalter, Klasa, Maxwell (2007)
investigate whether a firm facing higher competition (or a predation risk) from its
rivals faces a risk of incurring losses in market share and whether the firm
manages that specific risk. They find that the firm’s investment opportunities are
dependent on the level of competition it faces from its peers. Thus, they show that
predation risk in an important factor which affects a firm’s investment choices.
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure
coined “fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product
characteristics and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They
investigate the relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout
policy and cash holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm
faces, the lower the likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares.
They also find that the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase
in cash holding. Leary and Roberts (2010) show that firms do not make financing
decisions in isolation. They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in
response to the financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller
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and less successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to
larger and more successful rivals. Fresard and Foucault (2012) show that there is a
link between a firm’s investment and the stock price of its peers. More
specifically, they document that a firm’s investment is positively related to the
stock prices of peer firms that sell related products. They provide evidence that
this connection arises because managers can learn information from observing the
stock price of their peers. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their
peers. Fresard and Valta (2013) examine the effect of trade globalization and
competition on U.S. firms’ investments. The find that when firms face more
competition they tend to pursue more conservative investment choices. More
specifically, those firms tend to reduce capital and R&D expenditures and
increase their cash holding. Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2008) investigate the
relationship between board structure and price informativeness. They find a
negative relationship between price informativeness and board independence.
They use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a measure of stock price
informativeness. Their results reinforce the idea that stock price information and
board monitoring can substitute each other.
According to Fresard (2010), “several studies document that corporate
decisions are materially affected by the informational content of security prices.
In particular, Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that firms invest more
efficiently when their stock price incorporates a larger amount of private
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information. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) report that corporate investment is
more sensitive to stock price when prices are more informative. They interpret
this result as evidence that managers extract valuable information from observing
their stock price, and use this information when deciding on corporate
investment”. In this paper, we push the logic a step further and include the
element of threat in order to categorize firms in terms of the level of threat they
face from their peers.
Going all the way back to Triplett (1898), many scholars have documented
a link between competition and task performance and that rivalry is a powerful
psychological phenomenon with substantial behavioral consequences. Kilduff,
Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state that “they believe that rivalry may have a range
of important consequences for the attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of
competitors.

A number of studies have linked competition to enhanced

motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and Tauer and Harackiewicz (2004)) and
task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown et al. (1998), and Tauer amd
Harackiewicz (2004))”. Product market competition makes managers work more
efficiently. Hart (1983) shows that competition mitigates managerial slack.
Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase
in the number of competitors may provide additional information that can be used
to mitigate moral hazard. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market
competition provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently
because competition forces out incompetent manager.
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We rationalize that managers of a firm facing a higher product market
threat from its peers should learn even more from their corresponding firm’s stock
price movement s compared with less threatened firms. The logic is quite simple:
a manager of a firm facing a threat recognizes that his/her company is facing a
fierce competition and is desperately looking for information from investors in
order to mitigate the threat. One way of mitigating the threat is by looking for
additional information pertaining to his/her firm in order to make more sensible
managerial decisions. Given the fact the competition induces managers to work
more efficiently; it will be reflected n managers gleaning further over their stock
price movements. According to Atkins (2012), “competition in the equity markets
is analogous to competition over sales in the product markets (Holden and
Subrahmanyam 1992). In product markets, firms with monopoly power over
product sales extract rents from consumers; more competition between firms over
product sales reduces this exploitation (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009). In equity
markets, informed traders with monopoly power over private information extract
rents by trading against less informed traders (e.g., liquidity traders). More
competition between informed traders over private information reduces market
inefficiency”.
The logic used in the first hypothesis could be extended to the case where
a manager of a firm learns from the stock price movements of its peers. Hoberg,
Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure coined
“fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product characteristics
and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They investigate the
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relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout policy and cash
holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm faces, the lower the
likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares. They also find that
the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase in cash holding.
They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in response to the
financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller and less
successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to larger and
more successful rivals. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their
peers. Foucault and Fresard (2012) show that there is a link between a firm’s
investment and the stock price of its peers. More specifically, they document that
a firm’s investment is positively related to the stock prices of peer firms that sell
related products. They provide evidence that this connection arises because
managers can learn information from observing the stock price of their peers. We
postulate that the link found by Foucault and Fresard (2012) should be more
pronounced for a firm facing a threat from its peers. In particular, we rationalize
that a manager of a threatened firm should learn even further from the stock price
of his/her peers’ stock price movements in order to address the threat faced by
his/her firm. Leary and Roberts (2010) find that smaller and less successful firms
are more likely to adjust their capital structures and financial policies in response
to the actions of their larger, more successful peers.
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CHAPTER 3

Hypotheses Development
Empirically, several studies document that corporate decisions are
materially affected by the informational content of security prices. In particular,
Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that firms invest more efficiently when
their stock price incorporates a larger amount of private information. Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) report that corporate investment is more sensitive to
stock price when prices are more informative. They interpret this result as
evidence that managers extract valuable information from observing their stock
price, and use this information when deciding on corporate investment. In this
paper, we push the logic a step further and include the element of threat in order
to categorize firms in terms of the level of threat they face from their peers.
Going all the way back to Triplett (1898), many scholars have documented
a link between competition and task performance and that rivalry is a powerful
psychological phenomenon with substantial behavioral consequences. Kilduff,
Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state that they “believe that rivalry may have a range
of important consequences for the attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of
competitors”. They also add that “ a number of studies have linked competition to
enhanced motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and Tauer and Harackiewicz
(2004)) and task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown et al. (1998), and Tauer
amd Harackiewicz (2004))”. Product market competition makes managers work
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more efficiently. Hart (1983) shows that competition mitigates managerial slack.
Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase
in the number of competitors may provide additional information that can be used
to mitigate moral hazard. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market
competition provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently
because competition forces out incompetent manager.
We rationalize that managers of a firm facing a higher product market
threat from its peers should learn even more from their corresponding firm’s stock
price movement s compared with less threatened firms. The logic is quite simple:
a manager of a firm facing a threat recognizes that his/her company is facing a
fierce competition and is desperately looking for information from investors in
order to mitigate the threat. One way of mitigating the threat is by looking for
additional information pertaining to his/her firm in order to make more sensible
managerial decisions. Given the fact the competition induces managers to work
more efficiently; it will be reflected n managers gleaning further over their stock
price movements. This logic leads us to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Managers of firms facing a higher threat from their peers
are more sensitive to the information in their stock price movements compared to
less threatened firms.
The logic used in the first hypothesis could be extended to the case where
a manager of a firm learns from the stock price movements of its peers. Hoberg,
Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure coined
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“fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product characteristics
and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They investigate the
relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout policy and cash
holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm faces, the lower the
likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares. They also find that
the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase in cash holding.
They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in response to the
financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller and less
successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to larger and
more successful rivals. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their
peers. Foucault and Fresard (2012) show that there is a link between a firm’s
investment and the stock price of its peers. More specifically, they document that
a firm’s investment is positively related to the stock prices of peer firms that sell
related products. They provide evidence that this connection arises because
managers can learn information from observing the stock price of their peers. We
postulate that the link found by Foucault and Fresard (2012) should be more
pronounced for a firm facing a threat from its peers. In particular, we rationalize
that a manager of a threatened firm should learn even further from the stock price
of his/her peers’ stock price movements in order to address the threat faced by
his/her firm. Hence, the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2: Managers of firms facing a higher threat from their peers
are more sensitive to the information contained in their peers’ stock price
compared to less threatened firms
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) Data
To define a firm’s peers, I use the new Text-based Network Industry
Classification (TNIC) developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). According to the
authors, “this classification is based on text-based analysis of product descriptions
from firms’10-K statements filed yearly with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). They define as peers all the firms that belong to the same
TNIC industry in a given year. Their data covers the 1997 to 2008 period. Hoberg
and Phillips (2010)’s TNIC industries have three important features. First, unlike
industries based on the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) or the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), they are dynamic as they
change over time as firms’ products evolve. In particular, when a firm modifies its
product range, innovate, or enter a new product market, the set of peer firms
change accordingly. Second, TNIC industries are based on the products that firms
supply to the market, rather than its production processes as, for instance, is the
case for NAICS. Third, unlike SIC and NAICS industries, TNIC industries do not
require relations between firms to be transitive. In fact, as industry members are
defined relative to each firm in the product space, each firm has its own distinct
set of similar firms. This provides a richer definition of similarity and product
market relatedness.”
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Final Sample
I obtain Investments and accounting data from the annual Compustat
industrial files. This data constitutes a sample that covers the period 1996-2008. I
exclude firm-year observations for which total assets are missing. Stock price and
return information are from CRSP. After merging the CRSP with the Compustat
data and after deleting the top and bottom 1% of the regression variables, the
sample comprises 29,860 firm-years observations. Table 2 describes our samples.
Panel A presents the TNIC sample from Hoberg and Philips (2012), the Threat
sample from Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013), COMPUSTAT sample ,
Adjusted probability of informed trading APIN sample from Duarte and Young
(2007), and our Final Sample which is obtained by merging all the data sample
mentioned previously. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the main
variable of our final sample used in our analysis which include the Threat, Q
(defined as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of
divided by book value of assets), APIN (the adjusted probability of informed
trading), and investment INV (defined as Capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by
beginning-of-year assets).
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A presents
the samples utilized in order to reach our final sample. We start with the textbased network industry classifications (TNIC) sample used in Hoberg and Philips
(2012) which was obtained by using web crawling and text parsing algorithms
and therefore by constructing a database of word business descriptions from 10-K
annual listings on the SEC Edgar website from 1996 to 2008. The sample gives us
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a dynamic list of a firm’s peers during a each year. The TNIC sample is
constituted of 99,592 firm year observations. The Threat sample is obtained from
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) and introduces a measure of the product
market threat faced by firms covering the period 1996-2008. The Threat sample
is comprised of 65,535 firm year observations. We merged the two samples by
PERMNO in order to get our preliminary sample. The COMPUSTAT sample
covers all the firms contained in our preliminary sample which are covered by
COMPUSTAT. The APIN sample is obtained from Duarte and Young (2007) and
presents the adjusted probability of informed trading better captures the
informational component of probability of informed trading (PIN). The APIN
sample is comprised of 48,294 firm year observations. Finally, our sample is
obtained by merging the COMPUSTAT sample with the APIN sample and is
comprised of 44,716 firm year observations. Panel B presents the descriptive
statistics of the main variable of our final sample used in our analysis which
include the Threat, Q (defined as market value of equity plus book value of assets
minus book value of divided by book value of assets), APIN (the adjusted
probability of informed trading), and investment INV (defined as Capital
expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginning-of-year assets). Then average threat is
6.9516 with a standard deviation of 3.395 and a maximum of 27.262. Q ratio has
a mean of 1.9513 with a standard deviation of 1.504 and a maximum value of
59.126. The adjusted PIN (APIN) has a mean of 0.1393, a standard deviation of
0.068, and a maximum value of 0.698. Finally, investment (INV) has a mean of
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0.0626 billion dollars, a standard deviation of 0.196 billion, and a maximum value
of 6.065 billion.
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CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY
Herfindahl-Index
Testing our hypothesis requires a proxy for the degree of competition. In
order to measure the level of threat a firm is facing, we use the widely accepted
measure of competitiveness, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is according
to Wikipedia is “better known as the Herfindahl index, named after economists
Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman. The HHI is a statistical measure of
concentration which measures the size of firms in relation to the industry. In other
words, the HHI accounts for the number of firms in a market, as well as
concentration, by incorporating the relative size (that is, market share) of all firms
in a market. Following Wikipedia, it is calculated by squaring the market shares
of all firms in a market and then summing the squares, as follows:

(1)

Where si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms.
There is also a normalised Herfindahl index. Whereas the Herfindahl index ranges
from 1/N to one, the normalized Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 1. It is
computed as:
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(2)

where again, N is the number of firms in the market, and H is the usual Herfindahl
Index, as above.”
Bayes’ prior
According to F. J. Anscombe, J.R.S.S., 25 (1962) “There are several
paradigms for approaching statistical inference, but the two dominant ones are
frequentist (sometimes called classical or traditional) and Bayesian. The overview
in the previous chapter covered mainly classical approaches. According to the
Bayesian paradigm, the unobservable parameters in a statistical model are treated
as random. When no data are available, a prior distribution is used to quantify our
knowledge about the parameter. When data are available, we can update our prior
knowledge using the conditional distribution of parameters, given the data. The
transition from the prior to the posterior is possible via the Bayes theorem.
The central piece of Bayes’ rule describes how rational agents update their beliefs
after receiving new information. Suppose that before the experiment our prior
distribution describing θ is π(θ). The data are coming from the assumed model
(likelihood) which depends on the parameter and is denoted by f(x| θ): Bayes
theorem updates the prior π(θ) to the posterior by accounting for the data x,
θ π θ

π (θ | x) =

where m(x) is a normalizing constant, m(x) =
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(3)

θ π θ

θ

Once the data x are knows, θ is the only unknown quantity and the posterior
distribution π(θ |x) completely describes the uncertainty. There are two key
advantages of Bayesian paradigm: (i) once the uncertainty is expressed via the
probability distribution and the statistical inference can be automated, it follows a
conceptually simple recipe, and (ii) available prior information is coherently
incorporated into the statistical model”
Measure of informed trading (

)

In order to test our first hypotheses, I divide our sample into quintiles
based on the herfindahl index measure. To examine whether a firm’s managers
are sensitive to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein,
Jiang (2007) and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:
(4)

Where
effects.

is firm’s i investment in year t,

and

represent year and firm-fixed

is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s

Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding
from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year
t - 1.

is a measure of the private information in stock price and is

obtained by following Roll (1988) as
(5)
Where

are estimated each year from the following regression:
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(6)
Where

is the weekly return of firm i in industry j at time t,

return at time t, and

is the market

is the return of industry j at time t.

The rationale for using firm-specific return variation is based on a large
body of literature, both empirical and theoretical. French and Roll (1986) and Roll
(1988) were the first to show that a significant portion of stock return variation is
not explained by market movements. On this ground, Roll (1988) argues that
firm-specific return variation has to be correlated with private information.
Indeed, stock prices move with the arrival of new information, which gets
impounded into prices in two ways. The first one occurs through a revaluation of
prices following the release of public information, e.g. news on macroeconomic
conditions or earnings announcements. The second is through the trading activity
of investors who possess private information.
In order to test our first hypotheses using the threat measure, I divide the
provided by university of Maryland website and which gives us into quintiles
based on the measure of fluidity. To examine whether a firm’s managers are
sensitive to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein, Jiang
(2007) and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:
(7)

Where
effects.

is firm’s i investment in year t,

and

represent year and firm-fixed

is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s

Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding
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from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year t - 1.

is

a measure of the private information in stock price and is obtained by following
Roll (1988) as
(8)
Where

are estimated each year from the following regression:
(9)

Where

is the weekly return of firm i in industry j at time t,

return at time t, and

is the market

is the return of industry j at time t.

The rationale for using firm-specific return variation is based on a large
body of literature, both empirical and theoretical. French and Roll (1986) and Roll
(1988) were the first to show that a significant portion of stock return variation is
not explained by market movements. On this ground, Roll (1988) argues that
firm-specific return variation has to be correlated with private information.
Indeed, stock prices move with the arrival of new information, which gets
impounded into prices in two ways. The first one occurs through a revaluation of
prices following the release of public information, e.g. news on macroeconomic
conditions or earnings announcements. The second is through the trading activity
of investors who possess private information.
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Probability of Informed Trading
We also use the PIN measure developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O.Hara
(1996) as another proxy for the likelihood of informed trading in a stock. It is
used in a context related to ours by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Bakke
and Whited (2010). In our tests, we use an adjusted measure of PIN, developed by
Duarte and Young (2007), which better captures the informational component of
PIN.
Our regression in equation (1) includes the following control variables:
1/ASSETSi,t-1, CFi,t, INFOit-1 ,and INFOit-1.CFi,t. We include 1/ASSETSi,t-1
because both the dependent variable Iit and the regressor Qi,t-1 are scaled by lastyear book assets (ASSETSi,t-1), which could introduce spurious correlation. Cash
flow CFi,t is included both separately and in interaction with INFOit_1 to
accommodate the well-documented effect of cash flow on investment [e.g.,
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)]. We measure CFit as the sum of net
income before extraordinary items (Item 18), depreciation and amortization
expenses (Item 14), and R&D expenses (Item 46), scaled by beginning-of-year
book assets.
In order to test our second hypothesis, I use the sample provided by
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to identify a firm’s peers and then divide the sample
into quintiles following the same method used in testing the first hypothesis. I
follow Foucault and Fresard (2012) and test empirically the following equation:
(10)
where the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm I and and the year, while
the subscript -i represents a (equally-weighted) portfolio of peer firms based on
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the TNIC industries). The dependent variable

is a measure of corporate

investment in year t, which in the baseline specification, is the ratio of capital
expenditure in that year scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and
equipment). The variable,
1. The variable,

, is the normalized stock price of firm i in year t-

, is the (average) normalized stock price of firm I’s peers,

computed as the average Q across all the firms included in the same TNIC
industry as firm i in year t - 1, except firm i.

and

are the control

variables for firm i and its peers respectively and comprise cash flow and size of
the firm and its peers.
As in the regression in equation (1), we follow other papers Durnev,
Morck, and Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) in order to
measure the informativeness of a firm stock price with a measure of firm-specific
return variation (or price non-synchronicity).To test the model’s predictions, we
need to measure the effect of on the co-variation between investment and stock
prices, while holding constant the information pertaining to the firm’s peers (and
vice versa).

Heckman Correction

In order to investigate whether our regressions suffer from a sample
selection bias, we use the Heckman correction which, according to Wikipedia,
“consists of a two-step statistical approach and offers a means of correcting for
non-randomly selected samples. Heckman discussed bias from using nonrandom
selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships as a specification error. He
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suggests a two-stage estimation method to correct the bias. Heckman’s correction
involves a normality assumption, provides a test for sample selection bias and
formula for bias corrected model.

In the first stage, we formulate a model, based on economic theory, for the
probability of working.” According to Wikipedia,” the canonical specification for
this relationship is a probit regression of the form

(11)

where D indicates employment (D = 1 if the respondent is employed and D = 0
otherwise), Z is a vector of explanatory variables,

is a vector of unknown

parameters, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution. Estimation of the model yields results that can be used to predict this
employment probability for each individual.

In the second stage, the researcher corrects for self-selection by
incorporating a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities as an
additional explanatory variable. The wage equation may be specified,

(12)

where

denotes an underlying wage offer, which is not observed if the

respondent does not work. The conditional expectation of wages given the person
works is then
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(13)

Under the assumption that the error terms are jointly normal, we have

(14)

where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to work
and unobserved determinants of wage offers u, σ u is the standard deviation of
and

is the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at

,

. This equation demonstrates

Heckman's insight that sample selection can be viewed as a form of omittedvariables bias, as conditional on both X and on it is as if the sample is randomly
selected. The wage equation can be estimated by replacing
from the first stage, constructing the

with Probit estimates

term, and including it as an additional

explanatory variable in linear regression estimation of the wage equation. Since
, the coefficient on can only be zero if

, so testing the null that

the coefficient on is zero is equivalent to testing for sample selectivity.”

Product Market Threat
Following Hoberg and Fresard In order to test our first hypotheses, I
divide the sample provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2012)’s into quintiles based
on the measure of fluidity. To examine whether a firm’s managers are sensitive
to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein, Jiang (2007)
and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:

(15)
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Where

is firm’s i investment in year t,

effects.

and

represent year and firm-fixed

is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s

Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding
from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year t - 1.
We use the adjusted probability of informed trading APIN developed by
Duarte and Young (2007) as a proxy for the likelihood of informed trading in a
stock. It is used in a context related to ours by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007),
Bakke and Whited (2010), and Fresard and Foucault (2012).(Please see Appendix
1 for more details)
Our regression in equation (1) includes the following control variables:
1/ASSETSi,t-1, CFi,t, INFOit-1 ,and INFOit-1.CFi,t. We include 1/ASSETSi,t-1
because both the dependent variable Iit and the regressor Qi,t-1 are scaled by lastyear book assets (ASSETSi,t-1), which could introduce spurious correlation. Cash
flow CFi,t is included both separately and in interaction with INFOit_1 to
accommodate the well-documented effect of cash flow on investment [e.g.,
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)]. We measure CFit as the sum of net
income before extraordinary items (Item 18), depreciation and amortization
expenses (Item 14), and R&D expenses (Item 46), scaled by beginning-of-year
book assets.
In order to test our second hypothesis, I use the sample provided by
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to identify a firm’s peers and then divide the sample
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into quintiles following the same method used in testing the first hypothesis. I
follow Foucault and Fresard (2012) and test empirically the following equation:

(16)

where the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm i and and the year, while
the subscript -i represents a (equally-weighted) portfolio of peer firms based on
the TNIC industries). The dependent variable

is a measure of corporate

investment in year t, which in the baseline specification, is the ratio of capital
expenditure in that year scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and
equipment). The variable,

, is the normalized stock price of firm i’s peers,

computed as the average Q across all the firms included in the same TNIC
industry as firm i in year t - 1, except firm i.
i and comprise cash flow and size of the firm.

is the control variable for firm
is the probability of

informed trading of firm i’s peer firms.
As in the regression in equation (1), we follow other papers Durnev, Morck, and
Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) in order to measure the
informativeness of a firm stock price with a measure of firm-specific return
variation (or price non-synchronicity).To test the model’s predictions, we need to
measure the effect of on the co-variation between investment and stock prices,
while holding constant the informationpertaining to the firm’s peers (and vice
versa).
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Fluidity Measure

The notion that rival threats are important, perhaps even more so than
static measures of market share, is consistent with theories of contestable markets
in industrial organization (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)). In order to gauge
the level of threat faced by a firm, I utilize a measure introduced by Philips,
Hoberg, and Prabhala (2013) coined “Fluidity”. According to the authors, “they
use computational linguistics to analyze over 42,000 individual firm business
descriptions from firm 10-Ks to construct new measures of the structure and
evolution of the product space occupied by firms. These measures include product
fluidity, a new measure of the competitive threats faced by a firm in its product
market, which captures changes in rival firms' products relative to the firm. More
specifically, fluidity captures how rivals are changing the product words that
overlap with firm i's vocabulary. Fluidity focuses on product space dynamics and
changes in products. Specifically, let

denote a scalar equal to the number of all

unique words used in the product descriptions of all firms in year t. Let
an ordered Boolean vector of length
by firm i in year t. Element j of

identifying which of the

words are used

equals 1 if firm i uses word j in its product

description and is zero otherwise. They normalize
the result is

denote

to unit length and define

.

To capture the changes in the overall usage of a given word j in year t,
they define the aggregate vector

as:

(17)
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So a firm’s product market fluidity is simply the dot product between its own
word vector
and normalized
:

<

.

>

(18)

Intuitively, fluidity is a “cosine” similarity between a firm's own word usage
vector and the aggregate change vector

. Quantitatively, the dot product in

Eq. (2) measures the cosine of the angle between the two vectors. Because the dot
product is based on non-negative vectors, fluidity is thus the cosine between
vectors in the first quadrant. Thus fluidity lies in the interval [0; 1]. Fluidity is
greater when a firm's words overlap more with

, the vector that reflects rival

actions. Thus it is larger when there is a greater competitive threat.”
Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)
Accrding to Fresard (2010) “The probability of information-based trading
(PIN) was developed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996). This measure is based
on the estimation of a structural microstructure model, where trades may come
from “noise traders” or “informed traders”. Je also add that “it has been shown
empirically that PIN is a valid measure of price informativeness. Vega (2006)
reports that stock with high PIN have smaller reactions following an earnings
announcement, which is in line with the idea that these stocks incorporate more
private information.”
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Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2008) document
a positive association between PIN and the sensitivity of investment to stock. In
this dissertation, we use an adjusted measure of PIN (APIN), developed by Duarte
and Young (2007), which better captures the informational component of PIN.
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CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS
As a prelude to our empirical findings, let’s first make some important
observations regarding the time series of the Standard and Poors (S&P) and the
U.S. gross fixed investment. Figure 1 presents the log of the Standard and Poors
index levels from 1995-2012. Figure 2 presents the log of aggregate investments
during the same period. Aggregate investment is defined as the total business
spending on fixed assets, such as factories, machinery, equipment, dwellings, and
inventories of raw materials, which provide the basis for future production. The
two graphs reflect episodes of a strong association between the stock market and
investment. In fact, the two graphs look almost similar which reflects the strong
relationship between investments and the stock market. We can see that during
the Dot-com bubble, which reached its climax in 2000, the S&P index dropped
significantly and the aggregate investments followed the same pattern. During the
latest subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-2008 the same scenario transpired.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample based on the level
of competition. In panel A, we present the statistics for all the firms constituting
our sample. We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of competition
faced by a firm following the Herfindahl measure of competition. Panels B
through F present statistics for firms in quintile 1 (firms facing the lowest level of
competition) through quintile 5 (firms facing the highest level of competition)
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respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. One salient observation is
that as the level of competition increases from quintile one to quintile five, capital
expenditure (a key component of a firm’s investment) increases as well. Capital
expenditure increases from 251.317 to 445.643 as we move from the firms facing
the lowest competition sample to the firms facing the highest competition one.
These results reflect the fact that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s
investment and the level of competition it’s facing from its competitors and hence
reinforce our first hypothesis which states that Managers of firms facing a higher
level of competition from their peers are more sensitive to the information in their
stock price movements compared to firm facing a lower level of competition.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample based on the level
of threat. In panel A, we present the statistics for all the firms constituting our
sample. We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of threat faced by
a firm following Hoberg, Philips, and Praphala (2013) measure of threat. Panels B
through F present statistics for firms in quintile 1 (least threatened firms) through
quintile 5 (most threatened firms) respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to
2008. One salient observation is that as the product market threat increase from
quintile one to quintile five, capital expenditure (a key component of a firm’s
investment) increases as well. Capital expenditure increases from 57.07 to 66.08
as we move from the least threatened firms’ sample to the most threatened one.
Also, Q increases steadily from 1.97 to 2.42 as we move from the first to the fifth
quintile. This proves that the stock price sensitivity is related to the threat faced
by a firm. These results reflect the fact that there is a positive relationship
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between a firm’s investment and the threat it’s facing from its competitors and
hence reinforce our first hypothesis which states that Managers of firms facing a
higher threat from their peers are more sensitive to the information in their stock
price movements compared to less threatened firms.
Table 5 presents the Pearson’s correlation between the level of
competition a firm is facing and its capital expenditure. We can see that the
correlation becomes stronger as we move from the sample of firms facing the
highest level of competition to the sample of firms facing the highest level of
competition from its peers. The correlation between capital expenditure and a
firm’s threat is equal to 0.007257 and increases to 0.18593 for firms facing the
highest level of competition. These results also reinforce our first hypothesis and
suggest that the correlation between competition and capital investment becomes
stronger as the level of competition a firm is facing goes up.
Table 6 presents the Pearson’s correlation between the level of private
information of a firm and its capital expenditure. We can see that the correlation
becomes stronger as we move from the sample of firms having the least level of
private information to the sample of firms having the highest level of private
information. The correlation between capital expenditure and a firm’s level of
private of information is equal to -0.011 for firms having the lowest level of
private information and increases to 0.001 for firms having the highest level of
private information. Again, these results reinforce our first hypothesis and suggest
that the correlation between threat and investment becomes stronger as the level
of private information increases..
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Table 7 presents the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s threat and its
capital expenditure. We can see that the correlation becomes stronger as we move
from the sample of firms facing the least threat to the sample of firms facing the
greatest threat from its peers. The correlation between capital expenditure and a
firm’s threat is equal to -0.04471 and is not statistically significant while it’s
statistically significant and equal to 0.02410 for most threatened firms. These
results also reinforce our first hypothesis and suggest that the correlation between
threat and investment becomes stronger as threat increases

Table 8 presents the regression described in equation (3) and controls for
the industry and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s investment
(defined as capital expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by
lagged total assets) on Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book value of
assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), probability of
informed trading (PIN), and the interaction of the probability of the information
of information trading (PIN) and Q which is represented as PIN*Q.

The

coefficient of 7.34 pertaining to PIN*Q, which is statistically and economically
significant, reinforces the idea that managers do learn from the information
contained in their firm’s stock price movement when making investment
decisions, concurs with previous empirical findings, and lends support to the
active informant hypothesis . Regression (2) regresses a firm’s investment on Q,
the probability of informed trading (PIN), the interaction of the probability of the
information of information trading and Q ( PIN*Q), the value-weighted market
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adjusted firm return for next three years (RET), cash flow (CF), and inverse of
lagged asset (Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the results obtained in the
regression (1) even after we controlled for return, cash flow, and size. The
coefficient of 1.65 is both statistically and economically significant and concurs
with our first regression results. We could also add that the R-square increases
from 43% in the first regression to 47% in the second regression which further
validates the explanatory power of the added control variables.
Table 9 performs the same regression as the one performed in Table 8 but
uses the adjusted probability of informed trading as a measure of private
information in a firm. Table 9 presents the regression described in equation (3)
and controls for the industry and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s
investment (defined as capital expenditure plus research and development
expenses scaled by lagged total assets) on Q (defined as the market value of
equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value
of assets), the adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN), and the interaction
of the adjusted probability of the information of information trading (APIN) and
Q which is represented as APIN*Q.

The coefficient of 4.08 pertaining to

APIN*Q, which is statistically and economically significant, reinforces the idea
that managers do learn from the information contained in their firm’s stock price
movement when making investment decisions, concurs with previous empirical
findings, and lends support to the active informant hypothesis . Regression (2)
regresses a firm’s investment on Q, the adjusted probability of informed trading
(APIN), the interaction of the adjusted probability of the information of
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information trading and Q ( APIN*Q), the value-weighted market adjusted firm
return for next three years (RET), cash flow (CF), and inverse of lagged asset
(Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the results obtained in the regression (1)
even after we controlled for return, cash flow, and size. The coefficient of 2.7319
is both statistically and economically significant and concurs with our first
regression results. We could also add that the R-square increases from 29% in the
first regression to 33% in the second regression which also further validates the
explanatory power of the added control variables.
Table 10 performs the same regression as the one performed in Table 8
but uses the Roll’s measure as a measure of private information in a firm. Table
10 presents the regression described in equation (3) and controls for the industry
and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s investment (defined as capital
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total
assets) on Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book value of assets
minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), the level of private
information (INFO), and the interaction of the level of informed trading (INFO)
and Q which is represented as INFO*Q. The coefficient of 2.02 pertaining to
INFO*Q, which is statistically and economically significant, also reinforces the
idea that managers do learn from the information contained in their firm’s stock
price movement when making investment decisions, concurs with previous
empirical findings, and lends support to the active informant hypothesis .
Regression (2) regresses a firm’s investment on Q, the level of informed trading
(info), the interaction of the level of informed trading and Q ( INFO*Q), the
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value-weighted market adjusted firm return for next three years (RET), cash flow
(CF), and inverse of lagged asset (Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the
results obtained in the regression (1) even after we controlled for return, cash
flow, and size. The coefficient of 2.29 is both statistically and economically
significant and concurs with our first regression results. In the same vein as in
tables 9 and 9, we could also add that the R-square increases from 34% in the first
regression to 43% in the second regression which also further validates the
explanatory power of the added control variables.
Table 11 investigates the firms’ investment sensitivity to the information
in their own stock price inside information and its link to the level of competition
measured by the Herfindahl index. We divide our sample into quintiles based on
the Herfindahl index measure, where quintile one presents the firms facing the
highest level of competition sample and quintile five presents firms facing the
highest level of competition sample respectively. Regressions (1) and (2)
implement the regression described in equation (3) for the least threatened firms’
sample. Regressions (3) and (4) implement the regression described in equation
(3) for the most threatened firms’ sample. The coefficient pertaining to the
interaction of a firm’s investment to the private information contained in the stock
price movements (PIN*Q) increases from a negative value of -8.98 to 6.226 when
we move from the sample of firms facing the highest level of competition in
regression (1) to the sample of firms facing the highest level of competition in
regression.(3). These results certainly support our first hypothesis and show that
firm managers are more sensitive to their stock price movements as the level of
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competition from peers increases. Once we control for return, cash flow, and size
in regression (2) and (4) our results still lead to the same conclusion. The
coefficient related the (PIN*Q) increases from -4.10 to 18.14 when we move from
firms facing the lowest level of competition to firms facing the highest level of
competition.
Table 12 investigates the firms’ investment sensitivity to the information
in their own stock price inside information and its link to the product market
threat. We divide our sample into quintiles based on Hoberg and Philips, Prabhala
(2013) measure of threat, where quintile one presents the least threatened firms
sample and quintile five presents the most threatened firms sample respectively.
Regressions (1) and (2) implement the regression described in equation (3) for the
least threatened firms’ sample. Regressions (3) and (4) implement the regression
described in equation (3) for the most threatened firms’ sample. The coefficient
pertaining to the interaction of a firm’s investment to the private information
contained in the stock price movements (PIN*Q) increases from 2.51 to 6.23
when we move from the least threatened firms in regression (1) to the most
threatened firms in regression (3). These results clearly support our first
hypothesis and show that firm managers are more sensitive to their stock price
movements as the threat from their rivals is greater. Once we control for return,
cash flow, and size in regression (2) and (4) our results still lead to the same
conclusion. The coefficient related the (PIN*Q) increases from 1.64 to 3.91 when
we move from the least threatened firms to most threatened firms.
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Table 13 investigates the Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock
price movements using the Herfindahl index as a measure of the level of
competition. It also presents the regression of firm’s investment I on the firm’s Q
((Q_Firm) and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). control for the year effect and the industry
effect. We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of competition
measure by the Herfindahl index. We perform the regression for all quintiles,
where quintile one presents firms facing the lowest level of competition and
quintile five presents firms facing the highest level of competition. In the first
quintile, the coefficient related to the price of the firm (Q_Firm) has a value of
2.72 and the one pertaining to the peer firms (Q_Peer) has a value of 0.25. As we
move from the first quintile (most competition) to the fifth quintile (most
competition), the coefficient related to Q_Firm increase of 1.08916 from the first
quintile to the values of 3.45, 6.73, and 7.65 for third, fourth, and fifth quintiles
respectively. All those values are economically and statistically significant. We
can see that there is a significant increase in the level of attention a firm’s
managers pay to movement in its stock price as the level of competition goes up.
.
Table 14 investigates the Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock
price movements and its relationship with the product market threat. It presents
the regression of firm’s investment I on the firm’s Q ((Q_Firm) and its peers’ Q
(Q_peer) . We control for the year effect and the industry effect. We divide our
sample into quintiles based on Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013) measure of
threat. We perform the regression for all quintiles, where quintile one presents the
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least threatened firms sample and quintile five presents the most threatened firms
sample respectively. In the first quintile, the coefficient related to the price of the
firm (Q_Firm) has a value of 1.08916 and the one pertaining to the peer firms
(Q_Peer) has a value of 0.095559. As we move from the first quintile (least
threatened firms) to the fifth quintile (most threatened firms), the coefficient
related to Q_Firm increase of 1.08916 from the first quintile to the values of
1.10915, 2.41347, 5.65501, and 4.62822 for the second, third, fourth, and fifth
quintile respectively. All those values are economically and statistically
significant. We can see that there is a significant increase in the level of attention
a firm’s managers pay to movement in its stock price as the level of threat
increases.

The coefficients related to Q_Peer give us an insight about how

managers react to the movements in their peers’ stock prices. We can see that the
coefficient increases from 0.09559 for the least threatened firms to 0.12269,
0.13477, and 0.14295 for the second, third, and fourth quintiles respectively.
When the level of threat reaches its highest level in quintile five, the coefficient
drops to negative value -0.08644 which seems to indicate that when facing a very
high level of competition, firm managers tend to cease to look at the stock price
movements of their peers and retrench.
Table 15 investigates firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment I (defined as capital
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset
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(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its
peers’ probability of informed trading (PIN). The values of 1.20 and 1.57 related
to the regressor PIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are both statistically
and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do indeed learn from
the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements. Table divides the
sample into quintiles based on the level of threat faced by the firm and performs
the same regressions. We can see that in regression (1) the coefficient related to
PIN*Q moves from -0.46081 and -0.66202 in the first quintile and the second
quintile where the level of competition is small to 2.98666 and 5.95565 in the
third and fourth quintiles where the level of competition is greater. We also can
see that when the level of threat is at its highest level (fifth quintile) the
coefficient drops to 1.1855 which indicates that managers tend to retrench when
the level of threat is very high. The same results hold when we control for a firm’s
size and cash flow.
Table 16 investigates firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment I (defined as capital
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset
(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its
peers’ adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN). The values of 3.16 and
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1.73 related to the regressor APIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are
both statistically and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do
indeed learn from the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements.
Table 17 examines firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment i (defined as capital
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset
(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its
peers’ probability of informed trading (PIN). The values of 3.84 and 3.25 related
to the regressor PIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are both statistically
and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do indeed learn from
the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements.
Table 18 divides the sample into quintiles based on the level of
competition faced by the firm and performs the same regressions. We can see
that in regression (1) the coefficient related to PIN*Q moves from -0.89 and 0.39
in the first quintile and the second quintile where the level of competition is small
to 0.99 and 2.64 in the third and fourth quintiles where the level of competition is
greater. We also can see that when the level of threat is at its highest level (fifth
quintile) the coefficient drops to 1.49 which indicates that managers tend to
retrench when the level of threat is very high. However, when we control for the
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firm’s size and cash flow, our regression results do not give up any signs of
retrenchment.
Table 19 divides the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat
faced by the firm and performs the same regressions.

We can see that in

regression (1) the coefficient related to PIN*Q moves from -0.46081 and 0.66202 in the first quintile and the second quintile where the level of competition
is small to 2.98666 and 5.95565 in the third and fourth quintiles where the level of
competition is greater. We also can see that when the level of threat is at its
highest level (fifth quintile) the coefficient drops to 1.1855 which indicates that
managers tend to retrench when the level of threat is very high. The same results
hold when we control for a firm’s size and cash flow.
In order to verify whether our analysis has a sample bias problem, we use
the Heckman measure as an additional robustness check to see whether sample
bias exists. Our results show that there is no sample bias issue and our regressions
yield the same results.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This dissertation contributes to the literature that studies the interaction between
product market competition and firm’s financial policies. The empirical findings
lend support to the “active informant hypothesis” and confirm that firms do learn
from their stock price movements and their learning gets accentuated when the
level of threat from competitors is higher. The empirical results also confirm that
firms do learn from the stock price movements and their learning increases as the
threat from peers is higher expect when the firm is facing the greatest level of
threat. This dissertation also reinforces the hypothesis which contends that
competition and rivalry induce firm managers to work more efficiently. We
proved that when facing a greater competition, firm managers are more attentive
to the information in their stock price movements and the ones of their peers. We
are tempted to explain behind the fact that at the highest level of threat firms
cease to learn from the stock price movement of their peers by a phenomenon of
retrenchment. I believe that this particular finding could lead to further research
pertaining to the psychology of managers when facing very high competition
levels and would lead up to a deeper insight about firm managers reaction to
competition. My hope is that this study inspires future work on better
understanding the mechanisms driving the strong interdependencies among
financial policies.
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Table 1: Variable definitions
The table provides the definitions of the main variables used in the analysis.
Variable

Definition

CAPEXRD

Calculated as capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginningof-year assets (%)

CAPEX

The capital expenditure scaled by beginning-of-year assets (%)

R&D

Research and development expenses

Q

Computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets
minus book value of equity divided by book value of assets

INFO

Measure of private information following Roll (1988)

Herfindahl

Four-digit SIC industry concentration ratios gathered in the
Census of Manufacturers

PIN

Probability of informed trading in a stock measure by

APIN

Adjusted probability of informed trading in a stock measure by
Duarte and Young (2007)

CF

Net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and
amortization expenses plus R&D expense, divided by lagged
assets

RET

Value-weighted market return adjusted firm return for next three
years

ASSET

Total book value of assets in billions of dollars

INV_AST

Inverse of total assets

Fluidity

Firm’s competition threat measure by Hoberg, Philips, and
Prabhala (2013)

INV

Capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginning-of-year assets
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics
This table shows the number of firm year observations for each datasets and the summary
statistics of the main variables. Panel A presents the TNIC sample from Hoberg and
Philips (2012), the Threat sample from Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013),
COMPUSTAT sample, probability of informed trading PIN sample from Duarte and
Young (2007), and our final sample which is obtained by merging all the data sample
mentioned previously. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of variables including
Threat, Q, PIN, and INV. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.
Panel A: Sample
Sample

Number of Firm Year Observations

TNIC Sample

99,592

Threat Sample

65,535

COMPUSTAT

55,787

PIN Sample

48,294

Final Sample

44,716

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Min
P5
P25

INFO

0

Mean

Median

P75

P95

Max

Std
Dev.

0.63

0.81

0.95

0.99

0.23

0.227

0.452

1.00

1.00

0.264

6.40

9.22

13.79

27.26

3.40

0.22

0.44

0.62

0.035

0.067

0.135

0.339

0.33

2.44

4.58

6.95

0.06

0.67

0.96

1.95

1.41

1.74

3.73

59.13

1.50

PIN

0

0.07

0.10

0.16

0.14

0.19

0.37

0.87

0.09

APIN

0

0.07

0.09

0.14

0.12

0.16

0.28

0.70

0.07

INV

0

0

0.01

0.06

0.04

0.07

0.20

6.07

0.20

Herfindahl
Threat
Q
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics across quintiles using Herfindahl measure
This table shows the statistics of the main variables for all firms and across quintiles based on the
level of competition using the Herfindahl index. Panel A reports the mean, median and standard
deviation of variables including Herfindahl, ASSET, CAPEX, Q, and CF for all firms. Then we
divide the sample into quintiles based on the Herfindahl measure and report the mean, median,
and standard deviation of the variables in each quintile in Panel B through Panel F. Q1 represents
the group firms facing the least competition while Q5 is the group of firms facing the most
competition. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from
1996 to 2008.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Mean

Panel A: All Firms
Herfindahl

0.339

0.272

0.264

Median

Std. Dev.

Panel B: Q1
0.792

0.799

0.174

ASSET

1975.811 1961.287 9042.272

3279.839

1669.370

1638.274

CAPEX

375.664

65.000

1071.07

251.317

37.898

870.042

Q

1.645

1.253

1.533

1.588

1.224

1.473

CF

0.068

0.074

0.328

0.056

0.079

0.601

Panel C: Q2
Herfindahl

Panel D: Q3

0.403

0.398

0.056

0.257

0.272

0.036

ASSET

1098.098

149.797

4218.484

1981.566

182.391

7418.197

CAPEX

280.102

49.081

774.040

472.475

82.191

1361.380

Q

1.689

1.349

1.659

1.592

1.241

1.708

CF

0.079

0.091

0.212

0.058

0.076

0.287

Panel E: Q4

Herfindahl
ASSET

Panel F: Q5

0.155

0.146

0.023

0.082

0.077

0.028

1957.636

226.1

5608.998

1561.014

276.203

5685.281
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CAPEX

426.823

40.655

1383.60

445.643

145.710

757.236

Q

1.879

1.308

1.729

1.488

1.203

0.919

CF

0.066

0.062

0.166

0.082

0.066

0.141
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics across quintiles using Threat measure
This table shows the statistics of the main variables for all firms and across quintiles based on the
level of threat. Panel A reports the mean, median and standard deviation of variables including
Threat, ASSET, CAPEX, Q, and CF for all firms. Then we divide the sample into quintiles based
on the level of threat (Threat) and report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the
variables in each quintile in Panel B through Panel F. Q1 represents the group of the least
threatened firms while Q5 is the group of the most threatened firms. The definitions of the
variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Mean

Median

Std.
Dev.

Mean

Panel A: All Firms

Median

Std. Dev.

Panel B: Q1

Threat

6.95

6.40

3.39

2.92

3.05

0.76

ASSET

1533.05

233.50

3077

1378.96

233.66

2787.89

CAPEX

57.59

7.04

117.52

57.06

8.58

113.04

Q

1.95

1.41

1.39

1.62

1.29

1.01

CF

-0.01

0.06

0.22

0.06

0.08

0.14

Panel C: Q2

Panel D: Q3

Threat

4.80

4.80

0.46

6.41

6.40

0.50

ASSET

1287.41

225.68

2728.76

1353.89

202.34

2840.20

CAPEX

52.94

8.45

107.88

52.05

7.08

108.23

Q

1.74

1.34

1.16

1.91

1.41

1.33

CF

0.04

0.07

0.18

0.01

0.06

0.20

Panel E: Q4

Panel F: Q5

Threat

8.38

8.33

0.68

12.24

11.64

2.22

ASSET

1642.24

225.43

3239.17

2002.73

293.32

3639.20

CAPEX

59.13

6.29

121.86

66.80

5.22

133.97
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Q

2.07

1.49

1.47

2.42

1.67

1.73

CF

-0.02

0.05

0.23

-0.10

0.01

0.29
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Table 5: Correlation between the competition faced by a firm and its capital
expenditure using the Herfindahl measure
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between the competition faced by a firm
(measured by the Herfindahl index) and its capital expenditure. We divide the sample
into quintiles based on the level of competition faced by a firm. Q1 represents the group
of firms facing the least competition while Q5 is the group firms facing the most
competition. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period
is from 1996 to 2008.
Quintile

Corr (Herfindahl, CAPEX)

p-value

Q1 (Lowest Comp.)

0.07257

<0.001

Q2

-0.03894

<0.001

Q3

0.01701

0.0014

Q4

0.12338

<0.001

Q5 (Highest Comp.)

0.18593

<0.001
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Table 6: Correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital expenditure using the
Fluidity measure
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital
expenditure. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat. Q1
represents the group of the least threatened firms while Q5 is the group of the most
threatened firms. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample
period is from 1996 to 2008.
Quintile

Corr (Threat, CAPEX)

p-value

Q1 (Lowest Threat)

-0.045

<0.001

Q2

-0.002

0.822

Q3

0.012

0.249

Q4

0.004

0.704

Q5 (Highest Threat)

0.024

0.020
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Table 7: Correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital expenditure using the
Information Measure
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s level of private information
and its capital expenditure. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of
information. Q1 represents the group of firms with the lowest level of private information
while Q5 is the group of firms with the highest level of private information threatened
firms. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from
1996 to 2008.
Quintile
Q1 (Lowest INFO)

Corr (Info, CAPEX)
-0.011

p-value
<0.039

Q2

-0.02

<0.001

Q3

0.012

0.026

Q4

0.052

<0.001

Q5 (Highest Threat)

0.001

0.016
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Table 8: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using
PIN measure
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between PIN and
Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect.
The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test
significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from
1996 to 2008.

Q

PIN

PIN*Q

(1)

(2)

2.54***

1.27***

(61.62)

(29.43)

-4.97***

-13.39***

(-12.97)

(-31.31)

7.34***

1.65***

(38.37)

(45.26)

PIN*CF

17.53***
(22.30)

CF

2.83***
(9.22)

RET

-0.22*
(-2.12)

INV_AST

0.059***
(75.99)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.43

0.47
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Table 9: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using
Adjusted PIN measure
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, APIN, the interaction between PIN
and Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of
the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry
effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test
significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from
1996 to 2008.

Q

APIN

APIN*Q

(1)

(2)

0.61***

0.42***

(5.06)

(3.29)

-4.94***

-4.72***

(-3.36)

(-3.23)

4.08***

2.73***

(4.33)

(2.80)

PIN*CF

38.25*
(1.79)

CF

32.27***
(8.62)

RET

-0.44
(-1.07)

INV_AST

0.03***
(4.07)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.29

0.33
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Table 10: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using
Roll’s private information measure
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD.
The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between INFO and Q, the interaction
between INFO and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the variables are provided in
Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q

INFO

INFO*Q

(1)

(2)

0.94***

-0.28***

(21.73)

(-6.57)

-3.01***

-3.11***

(-18.50)

(-19.50)

2.02***

2.29***

(30.85)

(35.08)

INFO*CF

24.85***
(15.53)

CF

34.96***
(30.74)

RET

-0.52***
(-3.52)

INV_AST

0.10***
(15.99)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.34

0.43
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Table 11: Firms’ investment sensitivity to own stock price inside information and
product market competition using Herfindahl measure and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions in two extreme groups: the firms facing high
competition and firms facing least competition. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the
level of faced competition (Q1-Q5). The firms facing the most competition are in Q1 while the
firms facing the most competition are in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The
independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between PIN and Q, the interaction between
PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.
We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown
here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Least Competition

Q

PIN

PIN*Q

Highest Competition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

4.77***

3.59***

-2.53***

-1.88***

(97.52)

(62.16)

(-11.97)

(-11.52)

15.74**

-0.26

-71.28***

-38.57***

(35.87)

(-0.50)

(-38.23)

(-28.49)

-8.98***

-4.10

55.73***

18.14***

(-46.20)

(-13.51)

(53.68)

(21.67)

PIN*CF

CF

RET

INV_AST

60.98*

-39.85***

(41.97)

(-6.98)

23.86***

24.36***

(39.13)

(19.36)

0.76

0.34

(0.86)

(-0.89)

0.06

0.46***

(29.18)

(162.79)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Adjusted R2

0.52

0.58

94

0.42

0.70

Table 12: Firms’ investment sensitivity to own stock price inside information and
product market competition using Threat measure and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions in two extreme groups: the less threatened firms
and the most threatened firms. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat
(Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The
dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction
between PIN and Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The
definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the
industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed
test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from
1996 to 2008.

Less Threatened Firms

Q

PIN

PIN*Q

Most Threatened Firms

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.77***

0.27

-0.30

-0.24

(4.55)

(1.46)

(-0.77)

(-0.50)

-3.91**

-1.10

-20.07***

-17.70***

(-2.21)

(-0.62)

(-3.04)

(-2.70)

2.51*

1.64

6.23**

3.91

(1.98)

(-0.62)

(2.11)

(1.23)

PIN*CF

CF

RET

INV_AST

-52.82*

-161.60

(-1.80)

(-1.64)

51.92***

44.67***

(8.65)

(3.11)

0.43

-2.55*

(0.66)

(-1.92)

-0.01

0.11***

(-0.64)

(3.78)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Adjusted R2

0.29

0.33

96

0.41

0.43

Table 13: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price movements using
Herfindahl measure
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment on its peers’ stock
price movements across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level
of threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are
in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include the
firm’s Q (Q_Firm), and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). The definitions of the variables are
provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept
coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

(Least Comp.)

Q5
(Highest Comp.)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2.72***

2.34***

3.45***

6.73***

7.65***

(109.75)

(115.64) (138.16) (143.41)

(78.04)

0.25***

0.15***

0.09***

0.01

0.03***

(10.55)

(9.72)

(6.27)

(0.49)

(0.69)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry
effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R

0.49

0.54

0.58

0.51

0.37

Q_Firm

Q_Peer
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Table 14: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price movements using
Threat measure
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment on its peers’ stock
price movements across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level
of threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are
in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include the
firm’s Q (Q_Firm), and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). The definitions of the variables are
provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept
coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

(Least Threatened
Firms)
(1)
Q_Firm

Q_Peer

Q5
(Most Threatened
Firms)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.09***

1.11*** 2.41*** 5.66***

4.63***

(73.11)

(46.85)

(13.11)

0.10***

0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14***

(99.68)

(17.83)

-0.09***

(5.88)

(8.72)

(9.49)

(5.51)

(-3.57)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R

0.42

0.34

0.47

0.48

0.42

98

Table 15: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information
using Herfindahl measure and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q_Peer

PIN_Peer

PIN_Peer*Q_Peer

(1)

(2)

0.38***

0.71***

(8.62)

(12.08)

0.96

0.74*

(0.38)

(1.64)

1.20*

1.57**

(1.00)

(2.17)

CF_Firm

1.13**
(2.29)

INV_AST_Firm

0.16***
(82.97)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.56

0.43
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Table 16: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information
using Herfindahl measure and APIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q_Peer

APIN_Peer

APIN_Peer*Q_Peer

(1)

(2)

0.03*

0.85***

(1.02)

(14.54)

-3.07***

-2.29***

(-6.76)

(-3.79)

3.16***

1.73***

(14.93)

(4.85)

CF_Firm

0.13**
(2.29)

INV_AST_Firm

0.16***
(82.89)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.25

0.43
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Table 17: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information
using fluidity measure and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q_Peer

PIN_Peer

PIN_Peer*Q_Peer

(1)

(2)

0.13***

0.17*

(4.80)

(1.86)

-2.99***

-2.58***

(-7.80)

(-6.87)

3.84***

3.25***

(20.01)

(17.29)

CF_Firm

9.06***
(119.90)

INV_AST_Firm

-0.01***
(-6.00)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.23

0.26
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Table 18: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using
Herfindahl index and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of
threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The dependent variable is
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between
PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample
period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q_Peer
102
PIN_Peer

PIN_Peer*Q_Peer

CF_Firm

INV_AST_Firm

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.97***

0.40***

-0.07*

-0.25***

-0.15

0.71***

0.27***

0.63***

0.022

-0.36*

(15.04)

(5.64)

(-1.79)

(-2.47)

(-1.07)

(5.55)

(4.58)

(7.67)

(0.27)

(-3.89)

1.81***

-0.55

-2.77***

-1.29*

0.06

0.74*

-0.80*

3.85***

-2.10

-2.64***

(3.63)

(-0.95)

(-4.99)

(-1.18)

(0.05)

(1.64)

(-1.68)

(5.65)

(-2.41)

(-3.23)

-0.89***

0.39*

0.99***

2.64***

1.49**

-0.57**

0.004

0.35***

0.72*

1.28***

(-3.06)

(1.20)

(10.50)

(5.73)

(2.32)

(-2.17)

(0.02)

(5.09)

(1.97)

(3.13)

-0.13**

4.85***

-6.18***

-0.28

16.12***

(-2.29)

(23.87)

(-27.94)

(0.61)

(36.30)

0.16***

0.14***

0.03

0.22***

0.49***

(82.97)

(107.8)

(44.97)

(126)

(201.6)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.31

0.36

0.36

0.19

0.25

0.43

0.56

0.48

0.49

0.69
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Table 19: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using
Herfindahl index and APIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of
competition faced by the firm (Q1-Q5). The firms facing the highest competition are in Q1 while the firms facing the least
competition are in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its
peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between APIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of
the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the
industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less
than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008.
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Q_Peer

APIN_Peer

APIN_Peer*Q_Peer

CF_Firm

INV_AST_Firm

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.17***

0.53***

-0.66*

-0.10*

-0.32**

0.85***

0.32***

-0.14**

-0.01

-0.31***

(18.04)

(11.43)

(-11.28)

(-1.81)

(-2.68)

(14.54)

(8.44)

(-2.66)

(-0.26)

(-4.05)

4.00***

0.58

-7.52***

-2.46*

-3.59**

2.29*

-0.19

-1.79**

-2.87

-3.35***

(6.01)

(0.90)

(-8.50)

(-1.95)

(-2.29)

(3.79)***

(-0.36)

(-2.24)

(-2.86)

(-3.27)

-2.49*

-0.35*

8.37***

3.42***

3.45***

-1.73

-0.42*

3.09***

1.53***

1.54***

(-6.33)

(-1.01)

(17.80)

(8.05)

(4.48)

(-4.85)

(-1.48)

(7.24)

(4.53)

(3.14)

-0.13**

4.85***

-6.13***

-0.26

16.11***

(-2.29)

(23.87)

(-27.74)

(-0.56)

(36.27)

0.16***

0.14***

0.03***

0.22***

0.49***

(82.89)

(107.79)

(44.13)

(125.94)

(202.57)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.31

0.36

0.39

0.19

0.25

0.43

0.56

0.48

0.49

0.69

105

Table 20: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using
Fluidity measure and PIN measure
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of
threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The dependent variable is
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between
PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample
period is from 1996 to 2008.

Q_Peer
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PIN_Peer

PIN_Peer*Q_Peer

CF_Firm

INV_AST_Firm

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.31***

0.29***

-0.07*

-0.31***

0.01

0.20***

0.29***

-0.06

-0.11

0.10*

(8.29)

(8.23)

(-1.79)

(-3.90)

(0.12)

(5.55)

(8.21)

(-1.67)

(-1.46)

(1.83)

-0.18

1.06**

-2.77***

-2.90**

0.84

-0.66*

1.05**

-2.74***

-0.99

-1.76***

(-0.46)

(2.26)

(-4.99)

(-2.35)

(0.79)

(-1.77)

(2.25)

(-4.94)

(-0.86)

(-0.90)

-0.46*

-0.66***

2.99***

5.96***

1.19***

0.04

-0.66***

2.95***

3.62***

-0.11

(-1.89)

(-2.72)

(10.50)

(9.92)

(2.81)

(0.17)

(-2.72)

(10.37)

(6.46)

(-1.38)

-9.06***

0.22***

1.19***

21.06***

17.76***

(-11.90)

(3.66)

(4.23)

(99.01)

(-78.90)

0.00

-0.01***

-0.01

-0.01***

-0.01***

(0.45)

(-3.13)

(-0.91)

(-3.50)

(-6.00)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R2

0.37

0.32

0.39

0.23

0.35

0.40

0.32

0.39

0.33

0.36
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Figure 1: S&P index Time Series
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Figure 2: Aggregate Investment Time Series
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Appendix 1
Probability of Informed Trading
According to Duarte and Young (2007) “Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara (1996)
model is based on the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987)
sequential trade models. The model contains both informed traders who trade for
speculative purposes based on private information, and noise traders whose reasons
for trading are exogenous. It also posits the existence of an uninformed liquidity
provider who sets the bid and ask quotes by observing the flow of buy and sell
orders, and assessing the probability that the orders come from informed traders.
The bid-ask spread compensates the liquidity provider for the possibility of trading
with the informed traders. At the beginning of each day, nature decides whether a
private information event will occur. The probability that a private information
event will occur on a given day is a. If a private information event occurs on a
particular day, informed traders receive a private signal which is positive with
probability d. If the signal is positive, buy order flow for that day arrives according
to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter µ+

and sell order flow arrives

according to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter

. The intuition is that

on days with positive private information, both informed traders and noise traders
arrive in the market as buyers. The total buy order flow for the day therefore
consists of arrivals of both noise traders, who arrive at rate

, and informed

traders who arrive at rate u. On the other hand, only noise traders arrive to sell, so
the arrival rate of sell order flow is

. If the signal is negative, buy orders consist
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only of noise traders with intensity parameter

, and sell order flow arrives

according to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter

+ µ to reflect both

the arrivals of noise sellers and of informed sellers. If there is no private signal,
only noise traders will arrive in the market, so buy and sell order flow arrives by
Poisson distributions with intensity parameters

and

, respectively.

The PIN is computed as:

PIN=

The intuition behind the formula for PIN is that the probability of informed trade is
the ratio of expected informed order flow to expected total order flow.”
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Appendix 2
A sample of Least Threatened
Firms for 1997 (using threat
measure)

`

AAR CORP
ABC
DISPENSING
TECHNOLOGIES
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH -CL
A
AIR T INC
ALBERTSON'S INC
ALCO STORES INC
ALLOU HEALTHCARE INC
AMERICAN GREETINGS -CL
A
AMERICAN STORES CO
AMES DEPT STORES INC
ANGELICA CORP
ANN INC
APOGEE ENTERPRISES INC
ASTRO-MED INC
AVATEX CORP
AZZ INC
A Sample of Most Threatened Firms for 1997

3COM CORP
3DO CO
A D A M INC
ABAXIS INC
ABIOMED INC
ACTERNA CORP
ACTIVE VOICE CORP
ACTIVISION INC
ACXIOM CORP
ADELPHIA COMMUN
ADM TRONICS UNLIMITED
INC/DE
ADVANCEPCS
ALKERMES PLC
ALMOST FAMILY INC
AMERICAN WAGERING INC
ANSOFT CORP
APHTON CORP
ARV ASSISTED LIVING INC
ATC HEALTHCARE INC
ATL PRODUCTS INC
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